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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation develops a framework for the analysis of fiscal sustainability 
among U.S. local governments. Fiscal sustainability is defined as a type of fiscal 
condition that allows a government to continue service provision now and in the future 
without introducing disruptive revenue or expenditure patterns. An assessment of local 
fiscal sustainability is based on three types of indicators: pension liability funding, debt 
burden, and budgetary balance. Three main factors affect a government’s long-term 
financial condition: government structure, financial structure and performance, and local 
economic base. This dissertation uses a combination of the U.S. Census Bureau Annual 
Survey of Government Finances and Employment, the U.S. Census Bureau Decennial 
Census, the Bureau of Labor Statistics data, and the Government Finance Officers 
Association financial indicators database to study the effects of the three factors on local 
fiscal sustainability. It is a pioneer effort to use government-wide accounting information 
from Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports to predict local fiscal sustainability 
status. The results of econometric models suggest that pension liability funding is most 
affected by the size of government, debt burden is most strongly associated with the size 
of local economic base, and budgetary balance is influenced by the degree of local own-
source revenue diversification. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This study develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of local government fiscal 
sustainability and focuses on three important determinants of a government’s long-term 
fiscal health: pension liability funding, debt management, and budgetary balance. The 
study aims at identifying economic and financial factors that affect fiscal sustainability 
and at pointing out structural characteristics of governments that are on a fiscally 
sustainable path. It is based on the analysis of governments’ past performance and may 
be viewed as a variation of fiscal condition analysis. Yet, it analyses time-series data and 
goes beyond examining a snapshot of governments’ performance. The study focuses on 
pension liability funding and debt management – two indicators of local government 
financial condition that have long-term implications for the ability of a government to 
fulfill service obligations now and in the future.  The study extends beyond short-term 
fiscal condition analysis into an effort to operationalize the concept of local fiscal 
sustainability and explore its determinants empirically using individual government data 
for fiscal years 2003-2007.  
At present, there is no unified framework for the analysis of fiscal sustainability at the 
level of local government in the U.S.  There are three main explanations for such a void. 
First, fiscal sustainability as a concept is relatively new. Its definitions are still being 
formed. Though the notion of sustainability was brought into the policy context by 
environmental policy analysts at the end of the 1980s, most of the empirical research to 
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date has focused on national-level fiscal sustainability with the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund actively pursuing the sustainability agenda since the Asian 
crisis of 1997. However, the national framework where fiscal sustainability is defined 
through a government’s ability to repay debt is ill-suited for sub-national governments 
that exist under a different set of constraints, such as, for example, debt limits and 
balanced budget requirements. At the subnational level, theoretical frameworks of fiscal 
sustainability have only been developed in the past six years (Chapman, 2008; Ward & 
Dadayan, 2009; IPSASB, 2011; GASB, 2011; Mahdavi &Westerlund, 2011; Raju, 2011).   
Second, the concept of fiscal sustainability is difficult to apply to U.S. local governments 
that are highly decentralized and heterogeneous in their economic, financial, and 
organizational structures and institutional environments. This heterogeneity impedes 
quick and simple observations about elements of financial and organizational structures 
that make some governments more sustainable than others.  
And third, data availability and data quality problems have prevented fiscal health and 
sustainability analysis across governments. Local annual financial statements, 
comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFRs), and U.S. census survey data do not 
systematically include variables that are valuable for fiscal sustainability analysis, for 
example, actuarial valuations of pension fund assets and liabilities, property values, 
accurate annual demographic and economic profiles, and variables that would 
characterize financial management styles and expertise or measure similarities in local 
institutional environments.  Also, the data from different sources are very difficult to 
merge. As data-related challenges gradually disappear when more and more governments 
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switch to modern e-reporting platforms, the analysis of local governments’ long-term 
fiscal health and sustainability is likely to develop further due to its relevance for 
financial management decisions, policy makers, and for government’s accountability at 
large.  
A vast majority of American cities enjoy the freedom of fiscal federalism. They exert 
significant powers over revenue collections, the use of varying revenue sources, debt 
issuance, and service delivery.1 With that power to make choices they also carry a 
responsibility for financial decisions.  A government equipped with an understanding of 
the implications of its present decisions for its future ability to meet service requirements 
may be more careful in its decisions, more proactive in mitigating financial risks and 
more disciplined as a provider of public goods and services. It should be noted, however, 
that not all local governments may find long-term sustainability analysis useful. There 
may be no users of this information in entities with limited revenue raising powers, no 
powers to incur debt, and very narrow decision-making powers over levels of service 
delivery (IPSASB, 2011:7). Examples of such entities in the U.S. would include villages, 
towns and small cities with no home-rule status. 
The goal of this dissertation is twofold. The first objective is to create and test an 
empirical framework of local fiscal sustainability using a unique dataset of longitudinal 
financial and accounting records from municipal Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Reviews (CAFRs), U.S. Census Bureau Annual Survey of Governments, The U.S. 
Census Bureau Decennial Survey, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The second 
                                            
1 Tax, expenditure, and debt limits may constrain the ability of a government to exercise 
discretion over finances but not eliminate it. 
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objective is to identify and discuss the usefulness of accounting, financial and non-
financial information that local governments would benefit from and should collect for 
the analysis of fiscal sustainability. This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 
reviews fiscal sustainability literature that is relevant for the analysis at the local level. 
Chapter 3 synthesizes the literature into a theoretical framework. Chapter 4 describes the 
data and provides descriptive statistics for the cities in the sample. The correlation matrix 
for the variables used in the analysis is presented in Appendix B.  Chapter 5 develops 
model specifications for three separate components of sustainability. Chapter 6 
recognizes limitations of the study and offers conclusions and directions for future 
research.  
 
5 
 
Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
National Fiscal Sustainability  
The term ‘sustainability’ was introduced into the public policy context by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 (World Commission on 
Environment and Development, 1987). A development - meant broadly as a change in 
any environment - was deemed sustainable if it satisfied present generation needs without 
compromising the ability of future generations to satisfy theirs. This concept signaled to 
policymakers and analysts a way of discussing environmental and economic development 
goals simultaneously (Dollery and Grant, 2011) without juxtaposing them or looking for 
a tradeoff.  It also yielded a new normative orientation for managing public resources. 
In the 1990s the World Bank started funding research on national fiscal sustainability.2   
Burnside (2003), who is affiliated with the World Bank, notes that national fiscal 
sustainability has many definitions but they usually relate to fiscal policies of a 
government. Two supporting concepts of sustainability are important at the national 
level. The first is solvency that is “the ability of the government to service its debt 
                                            
2 National financial crises of the 1930s exposed social and economic costs of political 
decisions that led to government bankruptcy. Reparation payments, imposed by European 
countries on Germany after WW1, led to the country’s economic demise that contributed 
to the rise of fascism. The system of fiscal regulation was created in 1944 under the 
Bretton Woods agreement. It provided for the creation of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) whose major function was to set up a global exchange rate policy, help 
governments with problems in the balance of payments,  and provide policy advice to 
countries in need. Over the decades, the need to study causes of national financial crises 
has expanded the IMF’s agenda. The IMF has become a leader in fiscal sustainability 
research: it developed models to describe and classify country economies, explain past 
financial experiences and their causes and predict hazards to fiscal sustainability. 
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obligations in perpetuity without explicit default” (Burnside, 2003: 1). Burnside (2003) 
notes that a government is often deemed insolvent when the insolvency is already 
obvious. Such analyses inform the theory but do not offer guidance on preventive 
measures to avoid a crisis. The second concept refers to a government’s ability to 
maintain current policies while remaining solvent. It usually focuses on optimal fiscal 
and monetary policy adjustments to avoid insolvency in the future.  Burnside (2003) 
recognizes that fiscal sustainability analysis should be centered on the optimality of 
policy rather than its mere feasibility.  
Burnside (2003) points out that a clear understanding of the goals of fiscal sustainability 
analysis should precede the choice of methods for analysis. He distinguishes four 
potential goals of fiscal sustainability analysis at the national level: 1) estimation of the 
government’s ability to borrow; 2) prediction of the onset of fiscal crisis; 3) assessment 
of financial risks associated with contingent liabilities; 4) assessment of the prior fiscal 
policy record and discussion of future policy choices. (p.2)  Burnside’s parsimony of 
goals is attractive as a learning device but an empirical application of this parsimony 
reveals that the goals are not mutually exclusive. For example, a prediction of the onset 
of a crisis (goal 2) is likely to be based on the assessment of financial risks associated 
with contingent liabilities (goal 3).   
In the national context, fiscal sustainability is often operationalized as a minimized fiscal 
vulnerability to a capital account crisis.3  Fiscal sustainability is assessed through present-
value calculations of public indebtedness under different assumptions about future 
                                            
3 The implication being that a current account crisis may be solved through borrowing. 
So, the borrowing constraint becomes key for sustainability assessment.  
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macroeconomic and demographic environments. Such analyses produce predictions of 
changes in the primary balance4 under different projections of economic growth, interest 
rates, and public debt service obligations.  This relatively simple approach leaves the 
analyst with a need to choose assumptions about the future. As a result, market analysts 
tend to adopt cautious and conservative perspectives whereas government officials – who 
have vested interest in good financial performance of their jurisdictions - tend to choose 
scenarios based on more favorable assumptions (Barnhill and Kopits, 2003). Optimistic 
assumptions may also be attractive to politicians because they may provide a justification 
for such “electoral strategies” as tax cuts or expenditure increases. Another disadvantage 
of this scenario-based approach is that it does not account for different sources of fiscal 
risk.5 Polackova and Schick (2002) observe that contingent obligations tend be outside 
the framework of conventional public financial analysis while playing an important role 
in the rise of government debt. The authors offer to extend public fiscal management 
beyond the budgetary framework to measure and manage fiscal risks of implicit 
government obligations which they dub as “hidden deficits”.  The authors create a 
government fiscal risk matrix that distinguishes between explicit and implicit sources of 
obligations. These obligations can produce direct liabilities or contingent liabilities. 
Explicit obligations result from laws and contracts. Implicit obligations are “moral” 
obligations of a government that reflect “public and interest group pressures” (p. 23). 
Direct liabilities are certain in any event, while contingent liabilities become obligations 
                                            
4 Primary balance is measured as the difference between revenues and spending excluding 
interest payments on debt. 
5 For example, off-budget accounts and contingent obligations. 
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only if a particular event occurs. The table below reproduces Polackova and Schick’s 
(2002) matrix with some examples.  
Table 1. National Government Fiscal Risk Matrix (adapted and abridged) 
 
Direct liabilities Contingent liabilities 
Explicit 
obligation 
Sovereign debt, non-
discretionary expenditures, 
legally binding 
discretionary expenditures 
(civil servant salaries and 
pensions) 
State guarantees of non-sovereign borrowing 
(lower levels of government, other public 
and private entities), state guarantees for 
loans (mortgage, agriculture, student loans), 
trade and exchange rate guarantees, 
guarantees on private investments, state 
insurance schemes 
Implicit 
obligation* 
 
Future public pensions 
(not mandated by law or 
they would become 
explicit), social security 
schemes, health care 
schemes, future costs of 
public investment projects 
Default of a sub-national government or 
public/private entity on  nonguaranteed 
debt/obligations, banking failure, cleanup of 
liabilities of  entities being privatized, failure 
of a nonguaranteed  pension fund, 
employment fund, social security fund 
(protection of small investors), default of the 
central bank on its obligations (applicable to 
developing countries), environmental 
recovery, disaster relief, military spending 
* Implicit obligation is a moral obligation that reflects public and interest group 
pressures. 
Burnside (2003) suggests that modern fiscal sustainability analysis needs to incorporate 
the effects of uncertainty and move beyond the dichotomy of a sustainable/unsustainable 
government  to a more realistic discussion of the probability of insolvency. He references 
several studies that use the value-at-risk methodology (VaR) to model the risk and offer a 
more realistic and explicit way of factoring in risks of the public sector. One of them is a 
work by Barnhill and Kopits (2003). The authors adopt the VAR approach from 
corporate finance where it is often used to assess stock price changes and investment 
risks. Based on specific input parameters of risk factors, a distribution of possible 
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financial conditions is simulated and the probability of a financial crisis is determined.  
The simulation provides a confidence interval for the target outcome (e.g. the worst 
possible loss) and helps analysts to determine the necessary fiscal adjustment to 
compensate for the financial risk and maintain fiscal sustainability with a desired 
confidence level. Sources of risk at the national level are highly volatile exchange rates, 
interest rates, inflation rate, output, commodity prices, and asset prices (Barnhill and 
Kopits, 2003). Variance and covariance of key risk variables is critical for the VaR 
approach. The authors find that their Monte Carlo simulations predict fiscal vulnerability 
better than scenario-based calculations. They note that the future use of the VaR 
methodology for public sector sustainability research would benefit from more integrated 
risk assessments where, for example, the risk of bank failures and government default are 
modeled as correlated events. 6 
Local Fiscal Sustainability 
Fiscal sustainability at the local level has been defined in several ways. Chapman (2008) 
offers its definition as “the long-run capability of a government to consistently meet its 
financial responsibilities” (Chapman, 2008: S115) and identifies three types of pressures 
that governments face: cyclical, structural, and intergovernmental. Cyclical pressures 
reflect the influence of the business cycle on governmental finance and are often common 
for all the three levels of government. Structural pressures that affect fiscal sustainability 
                                            
6 An implication of this approach for local government is a potential inclusion of non-
local risk factors in the assessment of fiscal risks, for example, state unemployment or 
state fiscal imbalance.    
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include demographic changes, suburbanization trends, overall mobility of population and 
businesses, structural shift from the consumption of goods to the consumption of 
services, and the rise of new revenue sources such as e-commerce (Chapman, 2008). 
Effects of these factors on local ability to continuously meet financial obligations are 
direct and tangible. Structural pressures are, perhaps, the most actionable aspect of fiscal 
sustainability management because some of them are under local policymakers’ control. 
Intergovernmental pressures stem from local government relationships with other 
governments. While the federal government and states may not issue direct local 
mandates, they impact local financial conditions through “intergovernmental programs 
with many strings attached” (Chapman, 2008: S121).  
The International Public Sector Accounting Standards Board (IPSASB) views fiscal 
sustainability as “the ability of an entity to meet service delivery and fiscal commitments 
both now and in the future” (IPSASB, 2011: 5). It posits that an assessment of fiscal 
sustainability requires a broad range of data. “These data include financial and non-
financial information about current economic and demographic conditions, assumptions 
about national and global trends such as productivity, the relative competitiveness of the 
national or local economy and expected changes in demographic variables such as age, 
longevity, gender, income, educational attainment and morbidity” (IPSASB, 2011:6). The 
IPSASB (2011) distinguishes three broad dimensions of fiscal sustainability:  fiscal 
capacity; service capacity, and vulnerability. Fiscal capacity is the ability of a 
government to repay liabilities “on a continuing basis over the period of projections 
without increasing levels of taxation” (IPSASB, 2011: 8). Service capacity “is the extent 
to which (a) the entity can maintain services at the volume and quality provided to 
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current recipients at the reporting date and (b) meet obligations related to entitlement 
programs for current and future beneficiaries” (IPSASB, 2011: 8).  Vulnerability is the 
degree of fiscal dependence on funding sources that are outside the entity’s control (ex. 
inter-governmental transfers) and the degree of the entity’s ability to increase revenue 
levels and create new revenue sources (IPSASB, 2011: 8). 
The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB)7  views fiscal sustainability as 
“the forward-looking aspect of economic condition” and defines it as “a government’s 
ability and willingness to generate inflows of resources necessary to honor current service 
commitments and to meet financial obligations as they come due, without transferring 
financial obligations to future periods that do not result in commensurate benefits.” 
(GASB, 2011: x) The inclusion of a government’s willingness to generate resources is a 
unique feature of the GASB definition. GASB (2011) suggests that governments should 
make four types of projections part of their financial reporting: projections of cash 
inflows, cash outflows, financial obligations, and debt service.  In addition, they should 
include a narrative discussion of major intergovernmental service interdependencies in 
financial reports. These projections and narrative discussions should help users to 
                                            
7 The Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) is recognized by governments 
and the accounting industry as the official source of generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) for governments. GASB was formed in 1984 by the Financial 
Accounting Foundation (FAF) and 10 national associations of state and local 
governments to establish and improve financial reporting standards for U.S. state and 
local governments. GASB is an operations component of FAF, which is a private non-
profit entity, financed by the sale of its publications, state and local governments and the 
municipal bond community. GASB does not have the enforcement authority, and its 
standards are not regulations or laws. But compliance with GASB standards is enforced 
through the laws of certain states and auditing procedures (auditors render opinions on 
the compliance with GAAP). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 provided GASB with an independent source of funding - an 
accounting support fee from bond dealers.  
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determine local fiscal capacity and service capacity, which are not described in financial 
statements or CAFRs. GASB (2011) suggests that the projections be reported separately 
for government activities and business-type activities. In addition, separate predictions 
should be made for major resource inflows and outflows. (A significant inflow or outflow 
amounts to 10 or more percent of the total activity of a particular type.)  Ample 
disclosure of assumptions and their narrative discussion should accompany the 
projections (GASB, 2011). The GASB approach, described in the “Preliminary Views” 
distributed to the wider audience for comments, was not well received by the practitioner 
community. Government financial managers pointed out the difficulty of making 
accurate projections and being accountable for them. Such financial projections are 
inherently subject to uncertainties as they are based on current policy or assumptions 
about changes in social, economic, and demographic conditions.  
The Australian tradition of local fiscal sustainability analysis has a longer history than the 
American tradition.  Dollery and Grant (2011) review six studies of fiscal sustainability 
in Australian councils8 and conclude that they all share an “accounting” bias, meaning 
that they are too narrowly focused on accounting and financial ratios. The Price 
Waterhouse Coopers (PWC) report on Australian Local Fiscal Sustainability (2006) is 
one representative example of these studies. PWC defines fiscal sustainability as a 
council’s ability to manage “expected financial requirements and financial risks and 
shocks over the long term without the use of disruptive revenue and expenditure 
measures” (PWC, 2006: 95 as cited in Dollery and Grant, 2011: 38). PWC developed five 
                                            
8 A council is a name for Australian local government bodies for cities, shires and other 
municipalities. Terms ‘city’, ‘shire’, ‘municipality’ are also used but they denote 
geographic areas, not governing bodies. 
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financial ratios as key performance indicators and uses them to assess fiscal sustainability 
of a sample of 100 councils. These key performance indicators are presented in Table X: 
Table 2: PriceWaterhouseCoopers Key Performance Indicators  
Indicator Metrics 
Operating surplus or deficit: 
operating revenue – operating 
expenses 
A deficit of over 10 % of total revenue indicates 
a high level of financial risk. 
Interest coverage: 
earnings/borrowing costs 
The ratio of 3 or more is the lower threshold of 
sustainability. 
Sustainability ratio: 
capital expenditure/depreciation 
The ratio over one indicates that the assets are 
increasing. But note that the ratio may be biased 
due to changes in asset valuation procedures. 
Current ratio: 
current assets/current liabilities 
A sustainable government should have at least 
the ratio of one. 
Rates coverage:                                      
total rates revenue/total costs 
The ratio of 40% is considered by the PWC as a 
sustainable level of self-funding. 
 
PWC also conducted infrastructure sustainability analysis using a modified ‘viability 
index’ to gauge the level of pressures for infrastructure renewal.  The index includes 
three measures:  1) cumulative long-term debt/ annual rate income; 2) cumulative 
underlying operating surplus/debt; 3) rate effort, rates affordability, and population 
growth.   PWC (2006) recognizes that using performance indicators for comparing 
councils of different sizes may bias comparison results in favor of one type. Yet, they 
suggest that an assessment of financial performance without comparisons with similar 
governments may bias the evaluation even more.  
Dollery & Grant (2011) criticize existing approaches to fiscal sustainability from two 
perspectives. First, they posit that fiscal sustainability discussions should not be conflated 
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with discussions of fiscal viability.  Australian local governments are always fiscally 
viable because they have taxing powers and because the Local Government Act binds 
residents to meet all outstanding obligations. Governments cannot “go out of business” as 
commercial entities do. But governments may or may not be fiscally sustainable while 
having financial viability. Second, Dollery and Grant (2011) believe that the existing 
framework needs to incorporate the analysis of societal and environmental objectives and 
functions of governments. Researchers need to acknowledge that fiscal sustainability is 
contingent on the funding of environmental and social programs.  “Without prescribed 
economic requirements to meet environmental and social sustainability objectives in local 
government, it thus makes little sense to use the term financial sustainability in isolation.” 
(Dollery and Grant, 2011: 44)   
No empirical studies have modeled a comprehensive set of pressures on fiscal 
sustainability identified by Chapman (2008) and Dollery and Grant (2011). Hagist and 
Vatter (2009) echo Chapman (2008) in that they highlight the importance of demographic 
changes and population mobility.  In their view, a municipal budget is fiscally sustainable 
if it allows the government to maintain “current sets of rules with respect to public in- 
and outputs (goods, services, taxes and other receipts)… and the level of municipal 
equity relative to the municipal production potential.” (Hagist and Vatter, 2009: 6) The 
“municipal production potential” is directly related to the quality and quantity of the local 
labor force.  Hagist and Vatter (2009) use detailed accounting information for three 
German cities and examine their potential fiscal sustainability under several demographic 
scenarios. They operationalize demographic changes through projections of fertility rates, 
mortality rates, and migration. Simulations of the governments’ ability to bridge the fiscal 
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gap under different scenarios within a 50-year horizon allow the authors to conclude that 
“surpluses or deficits seem not to be the most determining factors for how fiscally 
sustainable municipalities work” (Hagist and Vatter, 2009: 24). In contrast, fertility rates, 
life expectancy, a percentage of population from the 30-50 age cohort, and migration 
rates appear to be important sustainability indicators. Changes in the demographic 
structure mediate negative effects of operational deficits (primary budget gap) and 
repayment of debt (the indebtedness gap). The authors criticize the cash-flow approach to 
the assessment of fiscal sustainability and posit that “focusing only on fiscal gaps or just 
debt without any comparison with the future economic power of the debtor is 
inadequate.” (Hagist and Vatter, 2009:8) It is noteworthy that Hagist and Vatter (2009) 
are pioneers in using simulations to analyze local fiscal sustainability; the dominant 
approach in national fiscal sustainability studies. The simulation approach, however, has 
been applied to the study of topics related to fiscal sustainability, such as the management 
of fund balances and fiscal slack (Hendrick, 2004; Kriz, 2003). As the fiscal 
sustainability paradigm is yet to be developed, research on  related concepts of fiscal 
stress and fiscal health is relevant for building the framework.  
Fiscal Stress 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) defines fiscal stress as a gap between projected 
revenues and expenditures that can be short-term, in the case of transitory economic 
shocks, or long-term, in the case of a structural budget imbalance (CBO, 2010).  Sources 
of a structural imbalance may include political tensions among budget decision makers, 
demographic shifts, especially when high income households or businesses move out of a 
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jurisdiction, lack of budgetary controls (BBRs, TELS, debt limits), and borrowing. 
Borrowing may be a source of but also a response to a fiscal crisis when short-term 
borrowing is used to alleviate temporary stress. When revenue sources consistently do 
not provide sufficient revenues to match spending, governments have to make hard 
decisions: increase revenues, decrease services, borrow long-term or shift 
payments/costs/expenditures into the future. (CBO, 2010). 
McManus and Pammer (1990) define fiscal stress as the level of strain of the property tax 
base and view fiscal stress as a factor that affects a government’s response to further 
changes in the economic environment.  Particularly, they identify three groups of factors 
affect government responses to stress: a government’s dependency on other levels of 
government, budget flexibility, and external environment. McManus and Pammer (1990) 
also highlight differences in retrenchment strategies for urban and rural areas. They find 
that urban areas tend to raise revenues in response to actual revenue shortfalls; whereas 
rural areas tend to cut expenditures. Lu (1994 cited in Cooper 1996) finds that smaller 
counties tend to reduce capital expenditures as a response to revenue shortages more 
often compared with larger counties with richer tax bases.  
Marando (1990) examines responses of 152 city governments to cuts in state aid – a 
change that qualifies as an increase in fiscal stress - and finds that operating and capital 
expenditure cuts are the most popular measures, followed by the contracting out of 
services through third party providers. A reduction in service levels is the least popular 
option among governments (which may reflect a stronger orientation of governments 
towards service provision than towards operating a fiscally sustainable enterprise).  
17 
 
Clark (1994) creates a city wealth index based on per capita income and taxable property 
value. He creates a fiscal strain ratio by dividing local per capita expenditures of common 
government functions by the wealth index thus taking into account variables that are 
under the control of the government (expenditures) and beyond it (tax base wealth).  
Though fiscal stress may pose significant limitations on a local government’s ability to 
satisfy local resident service preferences, it may also be an important disciplining device. 
So, Caiden (1980) suggests that fiscal stress may have a strengthening effect on local 
financial management as it requires governments to control expenditures. 
Carmeli (2003) distinguishes between a fiscal crisis – a gap between revenues raised and 
expenditures needed – and a financial crisis – a case when “an organization does not 
repay its current liabilities on time.” (1425) Whereas an organization facing a fiscal crisis 
may avoid a financial crisis by using reserves, the likelihood of a government to incur a 
financial crisis when it experiences a fiscal crisis is higher. 
Fiscal Health 
Zhao and Coyne (2011) identify three main ways to measure fiscal health: through 
revenue-raising capacity, through the need for local services or the underlying costs of 
their provision; and through need-capacity gaps.  Revenue‐raising capacity is viewed as 
the underlying ability of local governments to raise revenues from local sources. It is 
measured through the tax base (property values, measures of local economic conditions) 
but not through actual revenues that might reflect local choices of rates, not the 
underlying fiscal conditions.  An example of such capacity measure is an RRS - a 
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“representative revenue system” that relies solely on the size of a community’s tax bases 
(Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1986). Another capacity 
measure is per capita income (Ladd and Yinger, 1989). The need-based side of fiscal 
health includes a measurement of factors that affect spending on local public services but 
are outside the direct control of local officials -  local economic and social characteristics 
(e.g. population density, unemployment, poverty rate) (Ladd, Reschovsky, and Yinger, 
1991; Wasylenko and Yinger, 1988; Bradbury and Zhao, 2009). The need‐capacity gap, 
or fiscal gap measures the difference between a community’s underlying costs and its 
revenue‐raising capacity (Zhao and Coyte, 2011).  Zhao and Coyte (2011) find that the 
distribution of state unrestricted aid to municipalities is not strongly correlated with 
municipal capacity gaps. So, for example, the municipal gap constructed for FY 2008 
explained less than half of the variation in the municipal aid distribution and the 
explanatory power of the municipal gap remained unchanged in FY 2011, in spite of 
three consecutive years of aid cuts. 
Groves and Valente (1994) distinguish between short-term, midrange and long-term 
fiscal health. Short-term health has to do with the ability of a government to pay its bills 
on time; midrange fiscal health should reflect the government’s ability to balance its 
revenues and expenditures in the budget over a longer period of time. Long-term fiscal 
health is the service-level solvency, or the ability of a government to provide adequate 
levels of services over an extended period of time using the existing resource base 
(Groves and Valente, 1994 as cited in Hendrick, 2004).  Hendrick (2004) defines fiscal 
health as “the ability of government to meet its financial and service obligations.” (p.80) 
This definition approximates fiscal health to the concept of fiscal sustainability though it 
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does not mention the temporal aspect of government performance. In fact, after stating 
the definition Hendrick (2004) recognizes the importance of the time aspect of fiscal 
health. She reviews the literature on fiscal stress and general health indicators and 
demonstrates that fiscal health is a complex phenomenon characterized through different 
dimensions that may affect one another in different time frames.9 Local demographic and 
economic environment, social needs, fiscal needs, tax efforts and revenue-raising 
capacity, fiscal structures, fund balances, debt, and service generosity are only some of 
the factors that have been used to construct indicators of health. It appears from 
Hendrick’s literature review that fiscal health research gained  momentum in the late 
1970s (Brookings, 1976; CBO, 1978; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1978; Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1979), continued through the 80s (Clark 
and Ferguson, 1983; ACIR, 1988; Ladd and Yinger, 1989;  almost waned by the mid 
1990s (Brown, 1993) and revived in the new millennium to be marked by a seminal 
ICMA publication in 2003, Hendrick’s paper in 2004 and Kloha et al.’s publication in 
2005. Methods for constructing fiscal health indices included various ways of 
standardizing and scaling variables of interest (Brookings, 1976; U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 1978), factor analysis (CBO, 1978), scoring algorithms for standardized values 
(Brown, 1993; Kloha et al., 2005), calculation of fiscal health as the extent of  fiscal 
disparity  - the size of a gap between spending needs and costs of service provision (Ladd 
and Yinger, 1989), and a calculation of potential revenues from various revenue sources 
by multiplying existing local revenue bases by previously determined regional revenue 
                                            
9 e.g. “… municipalities with high levels of stress on one dimension may not necessarily 
have high or low levels of stress on other dimensions, although they are more likely to 
have high levels of stress across dimensions, and, over time, stress in one area may lead 
to stress in other areas.” (Hendrick, 2004: 89) 
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rates (ACIR, 1988). Hendrick (2004) develops the following four dimensions of fiscal 
health for Chicago municipalities: revenue wealth, spending needs, fiscal balance, and 
fiscal slack.  Hendrick (2004) insists that “[t]he complexity and indirect nature of the 
relationships between dimensions make it difficult to construct one, comprehensive 
indicator of fiscal health or financial condition. Rather, measures of these dimensions 
should be constructed separately and assessed in relation to one another to produce a 
complete and more accurate picture of fiscal conditions.” (Hendrick, 2004: 89)  Hendrick 
(2004) constructs her measures by standardizing component variables by standard 
deviations into z-scores, weighing them by regression coefficients10 and adding them up 
to form an index.  Hendrick’s index of the environmental component of fiscal health is 
based on three measures of revenue wealth: income per capita, sales receipts per capita 
and equalized assessed residential property value (statistics that are available for Chicago 
suburbs from the state comptroller) and on four measures of spending needs: median age 
of housing, weighted crime rate per capita, population density, and an indicator for the 
location of the government in a fire district. Similarly to Ladd and Yinger (1989) who 
calculate a fiscal disparity gap by subtracting service needs from revenue capacity 
Hendrick (2004) arrives at her index of environmental fiscal health by subtracting a 
measure of need from a measure of wealth.  Her use of the rank order of municipalities as 
measures of need and wealth is subject to criticism because it is highly dependent on the 
type of municipalities in the sample. Hendrick (2004) defends this approach by saying 
that it is more robust to outliers and allows for a better classification than a z-value based 
approach.  She constructs an index of fiscal slack based on four component variables 
                                            
10 Regression coefficients from a regression with the component variables as predictors 
and revenues per capita as the dependent variable.  
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scaled by local expenditures: the percentage of the unreserved fund balance, the 
percentage of enterprise income, the percentage of capital expenditures, and the 
percentage of debt service. The unreserved fund balance is the one variable in this set that 
measures directly available surplus resources available for bridging potential budget 
gaps. Hendrick (2004) points out that in her interviews with regional financial officials 
they acknowledge the use of enterprise funds in managing fiscal stress, though it is less 
direct than the use of unreserved fund balances.  Enterprise funds are less visible to the 
public because they are not part of government activities financial statements (however, 
they are part of government wide statements in the CAFR for governments complying 
with GASB Statement 34).  The percentage of capital expenditures is viewed by 
Hendrick (2004) as a fiscal slack variable on the grounds of the government’s ability to 
postpone capital expenditures and redirect the capital budget to the operating budgets 
should such a need arise.  Debt service expenditures are included into the fiscal slack 
index because their increase reduces fiscal slack. Governments are legally bound to make 
debt service payments irrespective of revenue decreases. When debt service burdens are 
high, a government facing a crisis will have a reduced flexibility in using spare resources 
for operating needs. Hendrick (2004) mentions another measure of slack that is important 
but not included in her analysis due to its non-linear relationship with other variables: a 
government’s size. Size is an element of slack because in larger organizations managers 
manage a larger number of activities and have “more horizontal and vertical linkages” 
(98) that increase their flexibility – the ability to make choices and tradeoffs - in 
managing resources.  Hendrick’s argument about differences among cities of a different 
size may be developed: established urban centers may enjoy a synergy of economic 
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resources that smaller cities may not have. Yet, size may or may not be associated with 
stronger fiscal health: larger governments are likely to have a larger scope of operations, 
higher revenue volatility and a larger proportion of their resources committed to 
expenditures that are mandatory. In other words, diseconomies of scale may exist. 
The fiscal balance dimension is captured in Hendrick’s framework with two ratios: own-
source revenues relative to wealth and total spending relative to needs. Wealth and needs 
are indices constructed previously for measuring the environmental health dimension. 
The fiscal balance ratios “reflect the extent to which the government has used up or 
captured the revenue sources in its environment and whether it provides adequate 
services to its constituents (businesses and residents).”  (Hendrick, 2004: 96) The more 
resources are used up, the fewer resources are available; the more services are 
underfunded, the harder it will be to cut spending and the greater the need for spending 
increases. After constructing measures of fiscal health in three dimensions, Hendrick 
maps these measures by municipality to show how governments in her sample fare 
against each other. She recognizes that future fiscal health research should focus on the 
effects of fiscal slack - an aspect of financial condition that has been often overlooked.  
Fiscal Slack 
Fiscal slack did garner attention of researchers in the past decade (Marlowe, 2006, Kriz, 
2003, Cornia and Nelson, 2003). Usually it includes general fund balances (reserved and 
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unreserved) and rainy day fund balances (this term usually applies to state finances) or 
sinking fund balances (this term is usually used at the local level11). 
Nollenberger (2003) distinguishes four functional categories of reserves: operational, 
catastrophic, replacement, and liquidity reserves.  It also highlights that there are no rules 
for governments to follow in allocating funds to reserves. The level of reserves should be 
a function of the level of risk associated with revenue and expenditure sources. Factors 
that affect reserve decisions include: kinds of natural disasters typical for the area, 
insurance coverage, revenue base flexibility, overall financial health of a government, 
state regulations and the national economy. 12 
Marlowe (2006) lists the following reasons for keeping reserves: fiscal stabilization, 
which is the most important, improvement of bond ratings, facilitation of strategic 
management, flexibility of the budget process, maintenance of consistent cash flow, and 
the maintenance of consistent tax rates.  
Marlowe (2006) defines a normatively optimal fund balance as “a pool of slack resources 
that is large enough to promote fiscal stability without raising opportunity costs and 
political friction.”  (Marlowe 2006: 373)  Through the survey of 245 small Minnesota 
municipalities Marlowe (2006) shows that even though 49 percent of the respondents 
have some form of a fund balance policy, most leave the optimal amount of funds to the 
discretion of the administrator. He finds that the average balance is between 31 and 39 
                                            
11 The sinking fund is a naming convention in the U.S. Census Bureau’s annual survey of 
governments. 
12 While the factors are very broad, the ICMA offers managers a test of ten questions that 
should guide local managers in the decisions on the levels of reserve fund resources. 
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percent of total expenditures which is much higher than the 5-15 percent range typically 
cited in the professional literature.   
Marlowe (2006) suggests that municipalities with non-diversified portfolios may need 
larger reserves because a decline in one revenue source may sharply reduce available 
revenues. However, revenue diversification is a double-edged sword. Diversified 
revenues may increase revenue volatility: if they are cyclical in nature then a drop in one 
revenue source is likely to be associated with a drop in another source. It would be 
valuable to include revenue source cyclicality as a separate characteristic in the analysis 
of revenue diversification. 
Marlowe (2006) also notes an apparent dependency between the level of slack resources 
and state aid disbursement to local governments. If state aid disbursements were bi-
annual or quarterly, local governments might not need to keep large slack resources. 
Similarly, if property taxes were collected more frequently, local governments would also 
be less likely to keep large slack resources. At the same time, modifications of the state 
aid disbursement may take away local financial autonomy: with frequent aid 
disbursements local governments may experience less financial flexibility and a 
disincentive for long term expenditure planning (Marlowe, 2006). 
Marlowe (2011) points out that financial management research has offered few 
alternatives in setting an appropriate level of fiscal slack that would allow a government 
to withstand an economic shock such as a revenue shortfall. As a result, local 
governments tend to simply set reserve requirements as a certain percentage of total 
expenditures (Joyce, 2001; Marlowe, 2011).  The disadvantage of this approach is the 
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opportunity cost of these reserves. By harboring excessive cash resources as slack, 
governments may forego potential short-term or capital investments and higher interest 
earnings than those earned on cash balances. Hoping to confirm that excessive slack adds 
no value, Marlowe (2011) hypothesizes s a concave effect of slack on local credit rating: 
after slack resources reach some optimum level, their positive effect on credit ratings 
should stall or drop. However, he finds that the effect of slack resources is monotonic: 
additional resources in the sinking funds have a consistent positive effect on 
governments’ credit ratings. At the same time he recognizes that different jurisdictions 
have different needs for slack resources.13 A high level of slack may help a fiscally 
stressed jurisdiction to secure a higher credit rating. But a high level of slack resources 
may not have the same effect for the credit rating of a fiscally flourishing municipality.  
Following GASB guidelines, slack resources are classified into reserved, unreserved 
designated and unreserved undesignated. Reserved are resources committed for a specific 
purpose and enforceable by a higher level government or local legislation; unreserved 
designated are resources that the management decides to spend on certain purposes; and 
unreserved undesignated resources are fund balances that are not associated with any 
potential spending purpose.  Marlowe (2011) points out that there is lack of uniformity in 
the classification of balances across governments. Some governments classify as 
designated resources what others classify as the unreserved; other governments include 
designated resources into the reserved. So, for example, some governments classify 
capital project fund balance as designated and others see it as unreserved because capital 
                                            
13 Marlowe (2011) examines a sample of 514 local debt issuers for 2006-2010 and finds 
that the levels of slack do differ among them. 
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spending is not specific enough until associated with a particular project. As a result, 
individual fund balances are not comparable across governments. Marlowe (2011) warns 
of the measurement and reliability problems in the case of examining effects of separate 
fund balances. His analysis of the impact of slack resources on credit ratings focuses on 
the unreserved and total fund balance of the general fund as well as on a broader measure 
of slack: unrestricted net assets. The total general fund balance consists of reserved, 
unreserved designated and unreserved undesignated components. Unrestricted Net Assets 
(UNA) are calculated following the accrual method of accounting, while unreserved fund 
balances are reported using the modified accrual method (revenues are recognized when 
they are available and measurable and expenditures – as soon as a transaction occurs).  
As a result, UNA reflect a more long-term financial position of a government while 
unreserved fund balances only include cash or assets that may be converted into cash 
quickly. Marlowe (2011) points out that UNA may be negative since they often include 
debt issued by the entity for another entity (conduit debt) that will be repaid with future 
resources that are not included in the calculation of the entity’s revenues. Marlowe comes 
up with a comparative measure of slack resources by scaling UNA by the total net assets 
of a jurisdiction.  
Kriz (2003) suggests that an optimum slack level should depend on a potential shortfall 
between revenues and expenditures. He equates optimal slack with the unreserved fund 
balance that will be required to bridge the gap.  Municipalities with more volatile 
expenditures or revenues appear to keep higher levels of slack to cover shortfalls in 
revenues or to adjust to increasing expenditures. Kriz (2003) questions the benchmark of 
5 percent as an optimal level of slack resources because he observes that localities have 
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diversity in revenue systems and differential exposures to financial risk. For example, 
large municipalities in Minnesota tend to rely more on intergovernmental aid and less on 
property taxes than small municipalities. In addition, their property tax bases differ. Kriz 
(2003) determines optimal levels of reserves for local governments using the simulation 
approach. He models expected local revenues as a function of past revenues multiplied by 
the revenue growth rate: E (R1) = R0 (1+U), where R0 is the present revenue, R1 is the 
future revenue, and U is the revenue growth rate.  Changes in revenues (U) are stochastic 
(random), determined by outside influences and cannot be forecast. Kriz (2003) assumes 
that revenues follow a stochastic process - the geometric Brownian motion – and uses the 
Monte Carlo simulation to model it. He identifies four main factors that affect the level of 
optimal reserves: revenue growth, revenue volatility, desired expenditure growth, and the 
interest rate earned on invested fund balances.  He views revenue growth and investment 
earnings as sources of risk for policymakers and desired expenditure growth - as a policy 
variable that can be managed. The budget reserve is modeled as a percent of current total 
revenues needed to sustain expected expenditure growth. The results of the simulation for 
10 years suggest that a government needs to maintain the reserves of 34 percent of the 
total revenue if it wants to have a 50 percent confidence that it will maintain a 5 percent 
expenditure growth in the market environment with 5 percent inflation (that is 10 percent 
nominal growth). To maintain the same growth with the same confidence, at the same 
inflation for 25 years, a government needs to maintain 121 percent of total revenues in 
reserves. The model is sensitive to the time scale and yet it demonstrates that there can be 
no magic rule of 5 percent reserve fund balance for governments to follow to escape 
budget shortfalls.  Kriz (2003) recognizes that his model is subject to criticisms since past 
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data may not be predictive of future conditions. Yet, he believes that the “burden of proof 
should lie with those that seek to model the future in a way different from the past” (p. 
892). He notes though that more historical data for analysis might add credibility to 
simulation results. One implication of Kriz’s simulation for practice is that the more local 
governments shift from property taxes as the main revenue source, the higher reserve 
levels they should keep to weather an economic storm. 
Cornia and Nelson (2003 cited in Marlowe, 2006) use a simulation of Utah revenues and 
expenditures, changes in revenue trends, and changes in the economy to establish a 
confidence interval for the expected revenue shortfalls. They conclude that there is a less 
than 5 percent probability that revenue shortfall would exceed 5 percent of general 
expenditures. Thus, they do defend the “magical” optimal fund balance level of 5 percent.  
Hendrick (2006) notes that fiscal slack has a complex relationship with the fiscal 
structure, as well as political and socio-economic environment of a government. She 
finds that municipalities tend to accumulate slack as the amount of fiscal risk or 
uncertainty increases. Interestingly, home-rule municipalities tend to accumulate more 
slack resources than non-home-rule municipalities. While Hendrick (2006) finds that 
slack is an effective response of Chicago suburban municipalities to changing conditions, 
she also points out that the effect of slack on reducing fiscal stress should be examined 
along with the other response options such as revenue increases and cuts in spending. It 
may also depend on whether the economic and fiscal conditions are improving or 
worsening.   
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Joyce (2001) studies the influence of revenue volatility on the size of state rainy day 
funds and finds little relationship between fund balances and revenue volatility. He uses 
five sources of revenue variation to construct a volatility index: the percentage of state 
revenues from corporate taxes, the volatility of economic environment (the proxy for 
economic environment changes is the change in unemployment rates), the percentage 
change in revenues gained from the federal aid, the percentage of revenues from 
gambling, and the percentage of spending on Medicaid.  Ranking the states from top to 
bottom, he assigns them relative scores for each component. This enables conclusions 
about states that keep insufficient or excessive reserves for their types of financial 
structures. Joyce (2001) recognizes that budgetary data may not offer a sufficient 
explanation of rainy day fund balances. He distinguishes 3 non-fiscal factors that may 
affect the reserve levels. First is the ideology of state policymakers: they will accumulate 
higher reserves if they believe that the funds need to shield the state from raising taxes or 
cutting services in a recession; they will accumulate  lower reserves if they believe that 
the funds should only offer a way to cover a short-term budget deficit. Second, states 
with high levels of inter-branch conflict may run larger reserves because they cannot 
hope to achieve consensus on actions to adjust the budget at the time of fiscal stress.  
Thirdly, states may have resources coming from other sources than the rainy day fund, 
for example, gubernatorial reserves. Joyce’s analysis debunks the idea that 5 percent is an 
optimal level of a state rainy day fund balance but recognizes that the index he 
constructed needs to be refined.  The research on the role of slack in fiscal management is 
moving in the direction of offering practitioners solutions that would be more fine-tuned 
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to their fiscal, organizational, social, economic and political environments than simple 
rules of thumb.   
Existing definitions of local fiscal sustainability acknowledge several pressures that 
governments face in meeting financial obligations. These pressures include factors under 
governments’ control such as financial structures and beyond it such as local service 
needs, intergovernmental constraints, and economic cycles.  Fiscal stress and health 
research informs the sustainability discussion by pointing out approaches to measuring 
and benchmarking local fiscal condition. The role of fiscal slack in managing local fiscal 
health is a subject of debate.
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Chapter 3 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Types of local government responsibilities 
Many U.S. local governments have a larger degree of fiscal autonomy than governments 
in countries with more centralized governance structures. The other side of financial and 
institutional independence is the expectation that local governments should be able to 
manage their resources effectively and be fiscally sustainable.     
Local governments provide a host of services to local communities that include but are 
not limited to police and fire protection, sanitation, solid waste management, sewerage, 
health and hospital services, highways and street management, library and cultural 
facility operation. Own-source revenues and intergovernmental aid represent an obvious 
budget constraint to the generosity of local government services. In addition, 
governments often operate under institutional constraints, both local and those imposed 
by higher levels of government. Balanced budget requirements, home-rule status, tax and 
expenditure limitations, and debt limits are some of the most widely discussed of these 
constraints.  
Besides providing general services to constituencies – fulfilling explicit direct short-term 
obligations - most local governments have explicit direct long-term service obligations 
that include repayment of debt and legally mandated discretionary spending such as 
salaries and pensions to public employees.  They also assume explicit contingent 
obligations when they commit to guarantee fulfillment of obligations of other public or 
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private entities. This happens when general governments guarantee the repayment of debt 
of their business–type activities (utility companies), school districts, community facility 
districts (CFDs) or issue conduit debt for altogether private companies.14 General local 
governments may also assume explicit contingent obligations of smaller levels of 
government as it happens when a city government guarantees school district debt. Local 
governments have implicit direct obligations in the form of future pensions to employees 
and obligations to continue financing public capital projects to provide adequate service.  
Also, localities may have implicit contingent obligations when they are “morally” obliged 
to step in if an important local service provider with non-guaranteed debt defaults or if a 
natural disaster strikes.  Unlike a national government, whose external market position 
becomes more vulnerable if it does not meet implicit contingent obligations (for example, 
because of banks defaults or defaults of large market industries), local governments enjoy 
much more leeway in determining whether to step in and address these obligation 
(partially because there are higher levels of government that may effect a bailout).  
Explicit and implicit contingent obligations have the potential to affect governments’ 
resource wealth negatively and represent the source of fiscal risk that is outside the 
government’s control. At the same time, the likelihood of these contingent obligations to 
materialize into actual obligations is quite small, as is the likelihood of default of local 
utility operations or force of nature events.15  This analysis recognizes potential sources 
                                            
14 Though by issuing conduit debt local governments do not take on any legal obligations 
to repay it, they may be inclined to step in to prevent a default if the debt funds publicly 
vital services. 
15 The inclusion of risks stemming from contingent liabilities in models presents analysts 
with the hardest challenge in national fiscal sustainability research. The challenge is as 
hard at the local level. 
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of risk from contingent obligations but does not include them in the sustainability 
framework. Instead, it limits the discussion to explicit and implicit direct obligations of 
governments that include current operations management, debt management and pension 
liability funding.  These sources of fiscal risk are more proximal, measured directly and 
may be acted upon.   
Besides these expenditure-driven sources of fiscal risk, there are factors that affect local 
fiscal sustainability on the revenue side. Primarily, local vulnerabilities on the revenue 
side relate to the government’s ability to secure sufficient revenues from existing revenue 
sources for satisfying existing obligations.  
Operational Definition of Local Fiscal Sustainability 
Local fiscal sustainability is viewed in this study as a state of government finances that 
allows the government to continuously provide services and satisfy all of its obligations.  
Compared with the concept of fiscal condition, fiscal sustainability has the inter-temporal 
dimension in that it relates to the government’s ability to satisfy service requirements not 
only now but also in the future. When a government’s fiscal condition is characterized as 
sustainable, the government is able to provide services expected by the community and 
perform its financial obligations such as debt repayment and pension benefit payments 
without compromising inter-generational equity and introducing disruptive revenue and 
expenditure policies.  
This work distinguishes between three key dimensions through which the level of 
sustainability may be assessed: pension liability funding, debt burden and budget balance.  
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The higher the level of pension liability funding, the lower the debt, and the smaller the 
mismatch of actual revenues and expenditures, the higher is the prospective capacity of a 
government to navigate changes in the economy and demography without the need to 
introduce service cuts or disruptive revenue increases. How a government fares on these 
conditions should depend on factors that have to do with the economic base, government 
organization, fiscal structure, and financial performance. A large share of fiscal 
sustainability research at the national level was conducted to predict governments’ 
defaults on debt. It focused on the identification of unsustainable governments and 
implicitly created a binary category: sustainable-unsustainable. The environmental 
sustainability paradigm has adopted three main states of sustainability: strong 
sustainability, weak sustainability, no sustainability (Chapman, 2008). In contrast, fiscal 
sustainability is viewed in this dissertation as a continuum, a characteristic that is more 
fluid and dynamic than any rigid categorical classification would suggest.  
It is important to acknowledge, that local financial management with a priority of 
maintaining fiscal sustainability may be in conflict with a fiscal management that is 
oriented towards improved service provision or/and meeting residents’ preferences.   In 
other words, less generous governments that are fiscally conservative, may have a higher 
likelihood of being fiscally sustainable. While fiscal austerity may be a panacea for fiscal 
problems, it may not be a normatively sound rationale for public service provision.  A 
vexing question for public administrators is not how to minimize spending but how to 
provide an optimal level of public services efficiently. It is therefore more promising to 
focus on characteristics of financial and institutional systems that make governments 
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successful service providers, instead of focusing solely on the governments’ ability to 
maintain balanced budgets.  
As earlier noted, this study will examine three distinct indicators of local fiscal 
sustainability: pension liability funding level, debt burden and budgetary balance. The 
ability of a government to fund pension plans adequately and avoid high debt levels and 
budget deficits may depend on a variety of factors that are grouped into distinct 
categories in this chapter after the discussion of three dependent variables.  
Indicators of Fiscal Sustainability 
Pension liability funding  
Pension liability obligations are long-term commitments of governments to pay pensions 
to retired employees. Unlike other post-employment benefits (OPEBs), another type of 
long-term obligations of local governments, pension obligations are contractual so that a 
government cannot walk away from them or decrease benefit levels with relative facility. 
In other words, pension liability obligations are the largest, the most binding, and 
therefore the most financially consequential type of local government long-term direct 
obligations. 
Public pension plans are generally more expensive than private plans as public retirement 
benefits are more generous than benefits in comparable private plans (Brown, Clark, 
Rauh, 2011).  There is usually a different plan for general government (all employees 
other than safety and teachers) and for public safety employees and teachers (if the local 
government mandate includes education worker employment). All full-time employees 
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are eligible to participate in retirement systems. In addition, part-time employees may be 
eligible to participate if they meet specific participation criteria.16  Cities often participate 
in multiple-employer public employee retirement systems that act as investment and 
administrative agents of all participants.17 Local pension contributions may go to locally 
administered or state administered plans (42% and 52% respectively, according to 
Munnell et al., 2011). Locally-administered plans are heterogeneous, including the largest 
New York City plans with assets over 30 billion dollars and plans that have less than 10 
million dollars in assets. Single-employer pension plans provide benefits to employees or 
one employer and multiple-employer pension funds pool assets from a number of 
employers to make investments and then distribute pension plan assets to employees 
based on their shares of contributions as reflected on the separate accounts of each agent 
employer.18   
As activities of pension funds benefit retired employees – third parties - and not the 
general public, they are usually accounted for in separate fiduciary funds and not reported 
as part of the direct government financial statements. Data on pension obligations are not 
part of the U.S. Census of Governments Annual Governments Survey.  A number of local 
pension plans make part of the Public Plans Database maintained by the Boston 
                                            
16 For example, eligible part-time employees of Stockton, CA qualified for pension 
benefits (Stockton CAFR, 2005). 
17 One example would be CalPERS – California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
providing benefits to more than 1.6 million public employees and 300 employers.  
18 Social security covers ~94% of employees in the United States. Government pension 
plan participants may or may not be covered by the Social Security benefits (Provision 
218). “Government employers might feel an increased responsibility to fund the plan if 
plan benefits represent their employees’ only source of retirement income.” (Munnell et 
al. 2011: 258) 
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College.19 A large majority of local pension systems, however, are still not amenable to 
research because they are not part of any database. Data on pension liability assets and 
liability funding that are used in this dissertation come from the Government Financial 
Officers Association’s database of local financial records that was created using 
individual city CAFRs. 
Munnell et al. (2011)  distinguish two measures of the financial health of local plans: 1) 
“the funded ratio” – showing the share of plan liabilities covered by assets; 2) the percent 
of annual pension cost  (APC) paid – which shows of the plan sponsor is keeping up with 
the obligations as they accumulate. Examining a sample of 126 pension retirement 
systems the authors conclude that locally administered plans have a larger share of plans 
that are funded at low levels, compared to state plans. On the whole, Munnel et al. (2011) 
observe that state and local pension plans were on the path to full funding before the 
Great Recession of 2007-2009. The crisis reduced the value of pension assets, resulting in 
an increase in the degree of underfunded pension liabilities. The drop in housing prices 
was an extraordinary development on the market and an exogenous shock for local 
governments.  
  GASB Statement No. 25 “Financial Reporting for Defined Benefit Pension Plans and 
Note Disclosures for Defined Contribution Plans”
20 requires government pension 
                                            
19 The database is publicly available at http://pubplans.bc.edu/pls/apex/f?p=1988:3:0  
20 Statement No. 25 will be replaced by Statement No. 67 Financial Reporting for 
Pension Plans after June 15, 2013 (GASB, 2012a).  
In addition, GASB has adopted Statement No. 68, Accounting and Financial Reporting 
for Pensions, a new standard to guide defined benefit reporting. It will be effective after 
June 15, 2014 and will likely result in governments reporting higher pension liabilities. 
For a more detailed account of the changes introduced by the standard, see Easterday & 
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disclosures to present 1) the discounted value of their future pension benefit payments, 
known as the accrued actuarial liability, 2) the value of their accumulated pension plan 
assets.  GASB’s standards are meant to affect reporting not funding of pension plans. 
“The Statements do not address how governments approach pension plan funding - a 
government’s policy regarding how much money it will contribute to its pension plan 
each year.” (GASB, 2012b) 
GASB requires that governments discount their pension liabilities using the rate of return 
on their pension plan assets (Easterday & Eaton, 2012). Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009a) 
view this approach to discounting benefits as misguided, primarily because it does not 
account for the risk of pension plan assets investment and may confuse users of the 
information about the amount of unfunded pension liabilities. They emphasize that if the 
governments choose assets with higher rates of return to fund the liabilities, the liability 
will appear smaller after discounting. But assets with higher rates of return are usually 
riskier and may or may not yield the expected outcomes. The discounting formula does 
not take the associated risk into account.21  The Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) requires corporate pension plans to use risk-adjusted discount rates for their 
future obligations. According to Easterday & Eaton (2012) while the public employee 
retirement systems steadily used the 8 percent discount rate in the calculations of 
liabilities in 2001-2010, the corporate rates dropped from 7.25 percent in 2001 to 5.55 
                                                                                                                                  
Eaton, 2012.  Munnell (2011 book) points out that the implications of GASB statements 
are important. The very fact that GASB does not set standards for actuarial valuation of 
pension assets is likely to result in financial data that will not be comparable across 
governments. In addition, lax requirements towards asset valuation may result in 
governments’ offering more generous benefits to employees than they would have.  
21 For a more detailed explanation of how the present value of the liabilities is calculated, 
see Rauh (2010) and Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010).  
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percent in 2005, went up to 6.3 percent by 2007 and dropped to 5.35 percent by 2010. 
The expected rate of return on pension assets in government administered plans was a 
stable 8 percent, while the expected rates of return on corporate pension plan assets went 
down from 8.8 percent to 7.55 percent from 2001 to 2010 (Easterday and Eaton, 2012). 
In fact, most economists object to this discount factor as too high (Brown and Wilcox, 
2009; Brown, Clark, Rauh, 2011; Munnell, 2011) and suggest that an appropriate 
discount rate should reflect the risk of the liabilities. As benefits of pension funds are 
usually guaranteed under state laws, the appropriate discount rate is a riskless rate 
(Munnell, 2011). According to the analysis by Munnell et al. (2011), the optimal discount 
rate for pension plan liabilities should be close to 30-year Treasury bonds, a most 
common type of similarly riskless securities. Applying alternative discount rates, 
Munnell et al. (2011) show that the 2009 pension funding gap for a sample of 126 state 
and local plans goes up from $0.7 trillion to $2.7 trillion.  
Levels of annual required contributions (ARC) to pension plans are developed by 
actuaries. They are usually based on two types of assumptions: demographic and 
economic. Demographic assumptions include expected mortality, length of service, salary 
growth (SLGE, 2013). Economic assumptions include expected inflation and investment 
returns. “The ARC includes the so-called “normal cost,” which is the projected growth in 
the present value of benefits generated by active employees in the coming year. It also 
includes any payment required to address unfunded liabilities, which are typically 
calculated over a 30-year amortization period.” (p.2)  If the fund sponsor (government) 
consistently makes 100 percent of ARC and if the demographic and economic 
assumptions are accurate (and they usually are in the long-run according to SLGE, 2013), 
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then pension liabilities are fully funded.   When either contributions are not made in full 
or assumptions diverge from actual demographic or economic conditions, the plans report 
unfunded liabilities. According to SLGE (2013), the value of the pension plan assets may 
go down because of a financial crisis so that it may fall below the present value of 
promised future pension obligations. Alternatively, pensions may be over-funded if 
pension plan assets generate high returns in the period of an economic boom. (SLGE 
2013).  
Munnell et al. (2011) highlight that a more realistic measure of pension liability funding 
may have a sobering effect and prevent plan managers from offering more generous 
benefits. However, a change in the discount rate that might be needed to reflect a more 
realistic amount of unfunded liabilities, cannot not be accommodated by governments, 
given the state of the economy. Localities just cannot significantly increase their pension 
plan contributions. The implementation of a change would need to wait until the 
economy exhibits a stable growth. “Moreover, changing the discount rate would have to 
be considered by the community of actuaries, accountants, and sponsors in the context of 
other changes, such as perhaps extending the amortization period from 30 to 40 years.  
That is, an increase in the measure of the unfunded liability need not automatically 
translate into an immediate and intolerable increase in annual amortization payments for 
states and localities.” (262) 
Debt Burden 
Local debt burden is a particularly relevant indicator of fiscal sustainability of a 
government, according to International City/County Management Association (ICMA) 
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(Nollenberger 2003). It is usually measured as a ratio of local direct debt or total local 
long term debt divided by population or personal income or some form of asset valuation. 
The denominator choice depends on what local financial managers consider to be more 
accurate as a measure of important changes in local conditions. In general, a fast increase 
in long-term debt may be an alarming sign for a government. A debt level within 10 
percent of assessed property valuation is considered appropriate. A high ratio may 
indicate excessive burden while a low ratio may signal underinvestment in public 
infrastructure (and decreased prospects for the development of businesses).  
Deficit 
While the majority of local governments are subject to explicit balanced budget rules and 
eventually present a balanced budget, in actuality, they seldom arrive at a natural balance 
at the end of the year. By nature a budget is just a plan for revenues and expenditures. In 
this regard, a budget is not deterministic. When revenues exceed expenditures, the excess 
is directed to a reserve fund, and more specifically to the unrestricted part of the reserve 
fund. If a government ends the year with a deficit, the reserve fund is tapped and the 
deficit is covered. Usually, if the balance in unreserved funds decreases from year to 
year, it may indicate consistent operating deficits.  The ICMA (2003) indicates that 
credit-rating firms do not pay too much attention to a deficit unless it is sustained over the 
years and is large. The lack of a clear operationalization of largeness is an incentive for 
testing models with different measures of deficit size. Prediction of fiscal deficits may be 
valuable for governments as a signal of the need for policy changes; for residents as a 
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signal that their taxes may increase and for investors in municipal securities as a tool to 
make more informed investment choices.  
Balanced budget requirements (BBRs) are designed to keep governments accountable 
and prevent them from accumulating operating deficits. However, as budgets are only 
plans of resource acquisition and use in the coming fiscal year(s), BBR do not make 
governments deficit proof. Moreover, a recent working paper by Costello, Petacchi and 
Weber (2012) suggests that BBRs also have unintended consequences by forcing states 
into “fire sales” – sales of assets below their book value - at the time of fiscal distress and 
by shifting expenditures into the next fiscal periods. Hou and Smith (2010) highlight the 
heterogeneity of state BBRs and find their differing effects depending on stringency and 
on the response variable that is used to measure budgetary balance.  The researchers 
define budgetary balance as “the situation where revenues available for government 
operations are greater than or equal to outlays at the start, middle, and end of the fiscal 
year or budget cycle so that the fiscal year ends in zero or positive balance (surplus) 
instead of deficit” (p. 63). They use six different measures of budgetary balance to model 
effects of BBRs. Four of them may be applied at the local level. They include: 1) total 
balance – the broadest measure equal to the difference between total revenues and 
expenditures;22 2) general balance – the difference between general revenue and general 
expenditures which differ from total revenues and expenditures by excluding utilities, 
liquor stores, and insurance trusts; 3) general fund balance – the difference between 
general fund revenues and expenditures – the most widely used measure of balance in 
                                            
22 The U.S. Census Bureau, however, explicitly indicates that the difference between total 
revenue and total expenditures does not necessarily indicate a deficit because the data are 
statistical in nature.  
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existing research (Hou and Smith, 2010); and 4) the unreserved undesignated balance of 
the general fund - the narrowest accounting measure of budgetary balance that is more 
exclusive because it is available only through CAFRs and not through the U.S. Census 
Bureau surveys. This measure does not directly measure any aspect of government 
operations. Yet, it is a valid approximation of local spare resources. 
I construct six measures of a government’s budgetary balance:  the difference between 
total revenues and total expenditures, a deficit, a severe deficit, the difference between 
general fund revenues and expenditures, a general fund deficit, a general fund severe 
deficit. I focus, however, on the first three measures of budgetary balance as more 
consequential for the local fiscal sustainability status. Models for the measures of 
budgetary balance through the general fund balances are presented in the Appendix.  
Table 3: Measures of Budgetary Balance  
 
This dissertation is focused on the analysis of the relationships of the three indicators of a 
government’s fiscal sustainability described below - pension funding level, debt burden, 
and budgetary balance - with three types of predictor variables that are described below.  
Variable Type Variable Construction 
Difference Continuous 
Total revenue – Total expenditure/ total 
expenditure 
Deficit Binary 
 If Total revenue – Total expenditure< 0, then 
Deficit=1 
Severe Deficit Binary 
If (Total revenue – Total Expenditure)/Total 
Expenditure<-0.1 then Severe deficit=1. 
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Predictors of Fiscal Sustainability 
Demographic and economic factors 
To a large extent, a local government’s ability to continuously perform its service 
obligations now and in the future depends on its ability to secure necessary revenues to 
cover expected expenditures. Local socio-demographic composition and economic 
factors are determinants of the local tax base, resident preferences for services, and 
spending needs. Local revenue capacity - the ability of governments to raise revenues 
from local resources (Zhao and Bradrury, 2009) - is affected by the welfare of its 
residents who pay taxes and consume public fee-based services. The use of income per 
capita as a measure of demand for services is a classic convention among public finance 
researchers (Ladd and Yinger, 1989; Hendrick, 2004).23 Resident preferences for local 
public spending also play a role in the local service provision.  Zhao and Bradbury (2009) 
find that the ability of local governments to tap into their property tax bases increases 
with residents’ incomes. They ground the finding in consumer theory where local 
residents’ incomes act as the budget constraint. The incomes influence resident choices 
for different bundles of private and public goods and services and influence the 
willingness of residents to subject themselves to increased property taxation that supports 
the provision of additional goods and services. Local demography, such as resident age 
distribution, race and ethnicity, as well as the percent of residents in poverty and their 
employment status may be relevant factors that governments consider in social service 
provision such as hospital care, income assistance, and public transportation. It is 
                                            
23 Statistically significant coefficients on this variable may be viewed as the evidence to 
support the median voter model.  
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important to note that some of these variables are correlated, for example, income per 
capita, poverty level and the unemployment rate. Their concurrent use in the models is 
therefore not justified. 
Due to high correlations among available demographic and economic variables, I use 
only a subset of them that are least correlated and present the most research interest. 
These variables include population size, population over 65, income per capita, the 
unemployment rate. I acknowledge that these variables may measure not only the 
economic base but also resident preferences for goods and services. Following Hendrick 
(2004), I recognize that spending needs cannot be the same for central cities that provide 
extensive social and health services and for smaller peripheral governments that do not.  
Overlapping Debt 
Local governments often have geographically overlapping jurisdictions such as 
community facility districts and various revenue authorities which also issue debt. The 
ICMA (2003) uses long-term overlapping bonded debt divided by assessed property 
valuation as a measure of whether a government will be able to assume the debt and 
service provision by an overlapping jurisdiction if it defaults. Though, the ICMA 
recognizes that the probability of this happening is slim, they find the indicator useful. 
What is surprisingly overlooked in the ICMA approach is the fact that overlapping debt 
may preclude a government’s ability to borrow from the same tax base. This work uses 
overlapping debt as a predictor variable in the model for local debt burdens. A locality 
reporting a higher overlapping debt burden on its CAFR should be likely to abstain from 
carrying high debt per capita.  
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Revenue Diversification 
Local fiscal sustainability should be directly affected by local revenues available for 
satisfying all current and future obligations of a government, for reducing the debt burden 
and for mitigating deficits.  City government revenues come from three main sources: 
local taxes such as the property tax, the sales tax, much less often the income tax24 other 
smaller taxes, sources other than taxes such as user fees and charges, and 
intergovernmental transfers.  Their relative importance in the local revenue budget 
differs. The property tax is still an important and often main revenue source for many 
local governments but the move towards revenue diversification has been very 
pronounced among local governments over the past three decades. According to 
Hendrick (2002), revenue diversification can be used as a productive strategy to reduce 
fiscal stress and tax effort. At the same time, it can increase revenue volatility or reduce it 
depending on what sources of revenues are used to diversify (Carroll, 2009) and on the 
condition of economic base (Yan, 2011). Suyderhoud (1994) suggests that revenue 
diversification may improve revenue efficiency and equity while Ladd and Weist (1987) 
argue that it is not a silver bullet and that its design and effects should be determined by 
policy objectives. Carroll (2009) examines the effects of tax and non-tax revenue 
diversification on revenue volatility and finds that both types of diversification tend to 
reduce volatility when the diversification away from local option sales and income taxes 
is implemented. She also examines effects of tax and nontax diversification on 
expenditures and finds no statistically significant effects. Sjoquist, Walker and Wallace 
                                            
24 Local income taxes are common only in some states, such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
New York. 
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(2005) study effects of diversification way from the property tax and find that it does 
decrease levels of property taxation but that it is also associated with increased levels of 
spending.  
Chernick, Langley and Reschovsky (2011) explore the degree of local reliance on 
property tax and define revenue diversification as the percentage of  local own source 
revenue collected from sources other than the property tax (diversity index=1 – (property 
tax revenue/total own-source revenue)).  They find that central cities that draw on a 
diversified mix of revenue sources have higher levels of per capita revenue. They point 
out that a city with a diversified tax system can set lower tax rates for every revenue base 
and thus reduce the deadweight loss from taxation. By raising revenues from multiple 
sources governments may be raising revenues more efficiently. Another explanation for 
the positive effect of revenue diversification on overall revenues is the idea that revenue 
complexity may shadow actual ‘cost of government’(Carroll, 2009) and produce a fiscal 
illusion: since revenue diversity often implies revenue complexity and dispersion across 
multiple separate revenue sources, it becomes more difficult for residents to clearly 
understand their total tax burdens and prevents them from actively monitoring 
governmental revenue levels and growth (Chapman and Gorina, 2012). 
A potential downside of revenue diversification away from the property tax is an 
increased reliance of a government on income elastic revenue sources. The latter 
comprise sales taxes, fees and various user charges. They show faster declines than non-
elastic sources at the time of economic crises. Local governments that rely on elastic 
sources more than others have a higher risk of facing a revenue shortfall when an 
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economic recession hits. At the time of an economic boom, elastic revenue sources are an 
advantage for governments to have because they keep up with inflation and allow for 
proportionate revenue increases. A good mix of revenue sources (elastic and inelastic) 
strengthens financial performance, according to Standard and Poor’s as cited in the 
Nollenberger (2003). 
Revenue Effort 
Local revenue effort is used as a predictor of three different dimensions of fiscal 
sustainability to test if a higher level of revenue effort is associated with a higher level of 
pension liability funding, lower debt and a lower likelihood of an operational deficit. 
Mildred and Pratt (2005) measure local revenue effort as the ratio of per capita own-
source revenues to per capita income. The researchers note that the assessed value of real 
property is not an appropriate measure of local capacity to raise revenues because of the 
lack of equalization of assessments.  Yet they implicitly acknowledge that property value 
might be a better alternative to personal income by having to explain why they choose the 
per capita income as the denominator and not property value.  The actual value of the 
city’s personal and business property is used in this work as the denominator in the 
revenue effort measure.  
Intergovernmental Aid 
There are two types of aid from the federal and state government to cities:  mandatory 
grants that are targeted for a specific function (often education or transportation in the 
case of federal grants) and discretionary grants that are allocated on an annual basis and 
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may be used by city governments for broad purposes. Most intergovernmental aid is 
distributed to local governments from states. The influence of state support of local 
financial structure and fiscal sustainability may go in two directions. State aid transfers 
may act as additional resources for strengthening local financial position. Normatively, 
state aid is designed to compensate for the disparity in local fiscal capacity provide 
localities. Zhao and Coyte (2011) find, however, that the distribution of municipal 
unrestricted aid is not strongly correlated with municipal capacity gaps. The municipal 
gap constructed for FY 2008 explained less than half of the variation in the municipal aid 
distribution and the explanatory power of the municipal gap remained unchanged in FY 
2011, in spite of three consecutive years of aid cuts. State aid may also negatively affect 
local fiscal condition if it acts as a soft budget constraint and depresses local 
competitiveness and entrepreneurial spirit. Compared to highly dependent governments, 
highly autonomous governments may use different revenues to fund their service 
obligations, may be more innovative and be efficient in service provision. 
Fee Coverage Ratio 
This indicator is otherwise known as “user charge coverage” and measures if collected 
fees and charges are sufficient for covering services that they are designed to finance.  
Government activity operations, unlike business-type operations, are usually not self-
financing. Yet, if a government covers a large share of its activities through fees and 
charges for the general services it provides, then the local government may have a wider 
fiscal space to rely on taxes for covering pension obligations and debt obligations.  
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Fiscal Slack and Net Assets 
The general fund is usually the main operating fund of a city. The general fund balance is 
the most direct source of fiscal slack for covering expenses.  A significant fund balance 
deficit at the end of the year raises concerns about the ability of the city to continue 
funding its operations. Resources accumulated in the sinking fund are usually the next 
step for governments who have exhausted their general fund balances. Yet, a government 
has an even broader spare resource base: its net assets. Net assets include not only general 
fund balances and sinking fund resources, they also gauge the level of local operating and 
capital assets net of debt. I posit that local governments with a rich base of net assets are 
more likely to avoid severe deficits. Governments may sell net assets if needed which 
they often do when face with a deficit. Governments with higher levels of net assets 
should also have lower levels of debt. First, debt is usually issued to fund capital assets. If 
the level of assets is already high, no need for debt issuance may exist. Second, non-
capital assets that are part of the net assets measure may make it easier for a government 
to pay out debt and keep the levels of debt under control. The use of net assets as a 
predictor in the models has become possible after the implementation of GASB 
Statement 34 by governments. 
The issuance of GASB Statement No. 34 in June 1999 marked a turning point in 
government reporting. It mandated two additional government-wide statements to be 
presented in the CAFRs of state and larger local governments after June 2001: Statement 
of Net Assets and Statement of Activities (Chaney, Mean, Schermann, 2002).  It also 
made the Management Discussion and Analysis section mandatory. The new reporting 
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model focused on government programs and functions instead of separate funds. The new 
statements were based on the full accrual basis of accounting and the economic 
measurement focus.25 The new reporting model was implemented by many larger local 
governments after June 2001 and provided analysts with an opportunity to study a 
government’s financial condition separately for government activities, business-type 
activities and for the government as a whole. (Chaney, Mead, Schermann, 2002) 
There are three components of net assets that are reported in government wide financial 
statements and that are part of the GFOA financial indicators database: net assets 
invested in capital assets net of related debt, restricted net assets, and unrestricted net 
assets. Net assets invested in capital assets net of related debt are calculated by 
subtracting related debt from the net book value of capital assets. The capital assets 
include land, construction in progress, buildings, improvements, furniture and equipment, 
vehicles, infrastructure and the intangibles, if any (copyrights, trademarks, trade names, 
etc.). If the outstanding debt for the assets is higher than the value of the assets, then net 
capital assets indicator will be negative. Restricted net assets are reported when 
constraints on net assets are set either by external creditors (other governments or 
individual contributors) or imposed through constitutional provisions or enabling 
legislation. For example, revenues from a newly created revenue stream that are to be 
                                            
25 Government fund reporting historically uses the modified accrual basis of accounting 
and the financial resources measurement focus. The modified accrual basis acknowledges 
revenues not when they are earned but when they become available.  The financial 
resources basis means that the focus is on measuring assets that are cash or are expected 
to be converted into cash within the accounting period. Proprietary fund reporting is 
based on the full accrual basis of accounting and the economic resources measurement 
focus.  In contrast, the economic resources focus measures not only cash and assets 
quickly convertible into cash but also long-term assets. In addition, the economic 
resources focus takes depreciation into account (GASB, 2007).  
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used for a specific purpose would make part of restricted net assets. Restricted net assets, 
unlike restricted assets in general, must be restricted by an external body or legislation. 
Restricted net assets cannot be negative because, they are a requirement of an external 
body or legislation and because all the shortfalls will be covered from unrestricted net 
assets. Unrestricted net assets are a plug number. They are calculated by taking Total Net 
Assets (which are calculated as Total Assets-Total Liabilities) and subtracting the net 
assets invested in capital assets and restricted net assets. (GASB, 2007) It is not 
uncommon to have a net assets deficit when a government finances long-term liabilities 
on a pay-as-you-go basis and appropriates resources each year as payments come due.  
Employment and financial administration 
A key premise of public administration as a field is that management matters. Sufficient 
staffing of government operations is a necessary precondition for a successful 
performance of various functions. From this perspective the number of employees per 
capita of a local government may serve as a proxy for the generosity of service provision. 
Apparently, the number of employees is not always associated with improved service 
quality; however, it is a sound assumption that as organizational capacities, and namely 
administrative resources, increase it becomes easier for a government to be more 
responsive and improve the quality of service provision. The effect of the number of local 
government employees on the government’s fiscal sustainability is less clear. Usually 
local governments employ personnel in common and variable functions, either full- or 
part-time. The common functions include areas where governments have extensive 
responsibility such as police and fire protection, sanitation, highways, and other general 
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services. Variable functions include employment in health and hospitals, public welfare 
services (usually higher levels of government are more involved in these functions) and 
utility operations (which may as well be operated privately). On the one hand, the larger 
the number of employees, the higher may be the implicit future obligations to them after 
retirement. From this perspective, the percent of full time employees as a share of total 
employees of the city may be a better measure of the effect of local employees on the 
city’s sustainability. On the other hand, the larger the government team, the larger the 
organizational capacity for using available resources and providing services in a more 
sustainable fashion. Organizational capacity of local governments, measured as 
employees per capita, may have indirect effects on local sustainability – the ability of a 
government to maintain service provision now and in the future in the face of economic 
and demographic shifts. At the same time, as the number of government employees 
increases, so does the room for internal competition, rivalries within organizations, and 
potential waste in service deliveries (Chapman, 1999), especially if the specialization 
within a department is too detailed. Though the data on city employment of financial 
administration personnel has been available from the Census Bureau for several decades, 
few studies have looked at the effects of finance personnel employment on the fiscal 
affairs of a government. Carmelli and Cohen (2001) suggested that a lack of 
organizational resources and managerial skills is one of the main reasons for a fiscal 
crisis as it leads to the inability of a government to provide services efficiently and adapt 
to a changing environment.  
It is sometimes argued in the literature that local governments use few if any strategies to 
resolve apparent structural problems in budgeting. Rather, when a crisis strikes or when a 
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budget revenues fall short of the expected, finance administrators act ad hoc and do not 
systematically learn from the past.26 This study proceeds from the assumption that an 
increase in local financial management capacity – as measured by the percent of financial 
administration employees among total government employees – should be associated 
with better fiscal sustainability indicators for the governments in all three dimensions: 
pension liability funding, debt burden and current operations deficit.  Besides the simple 
overarching mechanism for this effect on all three dimensions (more resources – better 
outcomes) there is a possibility for an additional secondary mechanism for the pension 
funding aspect. As the share of full-time financial employees increases, so does their 
vigilance over adequate pension plan funding, assuming that these employees will 
become beneficiaries of the local pension plans after retirement.   
Outsourcing Fire, Solid Waste, Sewerage 
Reviewing the likely developments in local governments over the next decade Joyce and 
Pattison (2010) foresee that the governments will increase the extent of privatization of 
public functions. “Outsourcing will also become more common among governments, as 
they will want to have projects done without bringing on lots of new employees who are 
permanent, costly, and difficult to get rid of either for political or contractual reasons. 
Therefore, budget offices in 2020 should expect to be dealing much more with oversight 
of contracts and contract management.” (Joyce and Pattison, 2010: S30)  
                                            
26 They may use four main strategies: buy time; rely on intergovernmental revenues; 
increase own-source revenues; reduce expenditures (Holley, 1983 as cited in Cooper, 
1996). 
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The benefits of service outsourcing may extend beyond the savings resulting from fewer 
pension plan beneficiaries. Niskanen’s public choice theory of good and service supply 
suggests that conventional government organizations with large degrees of monopoly 
over service provision (bureaus) provide goods and services tend to provide public goods 
inefficiently and uneconomically: they tend to grow too fast, become too large, and use 
too much capital (Niskanen, 1971). Bel, Fadega, Warner (2010) examine the rationale of 
public choice literature as a potential normative orientation for local contracting out.  One 
of the main mechanisms through which privatization of public services may produce cost 
savings is by replacing monopoly with competition which will lower the costs and restrict 
excessive supply of the services (Bel, Fadega, Warner, 2010). The underlying logic of 
cost savings is that public service delivery happens in a monopoly, politicians and 
bureaucrats will act as self- interested utility maximizes and manage the services to 
extract political power and material rents.  When competition is not strong, as is the case 
with public services – which are often “quasi-markets with a limited number of private 
suppliers” (555), the cost savings mechanism breaks down. So, governments still need to 
play a role in either creating competition in these markets or monitoring service delivery 
to realize cost savings (Bel, Fadega, Warner, 2010). Yet, a meta-analysis of the literature 
on outsourcing of waste management and water provision conducted by Bel, Fadega, 
Warner (2010) finds no convincing evidence that contracting out is a less expensive 
option of service provision at the local level than through direct government involvement. 
Their main conclusion is that effects of privatization depend on the characteristics of the 
service in question (potential technological developments), the characteristics of the 
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contract (transaction costs), characteristics of the market (competition), and the overall 
managerial and policy setting.   
The outsourcing variable is operationalized in this dissertation as follows. Local 
governments assigned the value of 1 for the binary measure of outsourcing services if 
they have zero payrolls on fire, solid waste and sewerage in the U.S. Census Bureau 
Database. 
Utility Operations 
A large majority of local governments run some kind of utility operations and have non-
zero utility revenues. As these business-type activities usually generate revenues that 
exceed their program costs, governments may either keep the revenues in the enterprise 
funds or transfer them into government activity funds. When such transfers happen, they 
are usually lumped with resources that may be transferred to localities from other local 
governments (e.g. counties) and are recorded as local intergovernmental aid (for example, 
Phoenix, AZ CAFR 2007).  
Local governments that run utility operation businesses may be more likely to be fiscally 
sustainable, as defined in this dissertation, because the enterprise fund revenues may 
provide additional resources for meeting pension funding obligations, avoiding high debt, 
and current budget deficits.  Utility programs (gas, electricity, water), airports, parking 
garages, public transportation systems are enterprise fund activities that are usually 
reported on the full-accrual basis of accounting.  Sometimes local governments take 
advantage of these operations and temporarily raise fees and charges to supplement their 
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general fund revenues. But these raises may or may not result in additional revenues 
because users respond to price hikes by reducing the use of the services.  
Intergovernmental Control 
State governments provide aid to local governments based on their assessments of local 
needs. Some states regularly monitor local performance may exert corrective actions to 
help local governments navigate fiscal challenges. Coe (2008) discusses state strategies to 
detect local fiscal distress in nine different states and shows that their level of 
involvement in local affairs varies greatly. Some states monitor local conditions very 
closely and use independent financial auditors to review local performance (Florida); 
others do it through separately established commissions like North Carolina’s, where a 
Local Government Commission that was created in response to municipal bond defaults 
during the Great Depression and still reviews local financial reports extensively. Other 
states, like Maryland, only have a small number of professionals to perform local 
oversight. (In the case of Maryland there are only two accountants who review annual 
financial reports of localities, enter the data in Microsoft Excel spreadsheets and make 
sure that they correspond to accounting and auditing standards). Besides differences in 
the degree of fiscal oversight, states have different degrees of authority over local 
governments if their financial condition deteriorates. So, Kentucky can order local 
governments to raise taxes and reduce expenditures, Florida, Ohio and Pennsylvania may 
recommend a course of action to local governments, while New Hampshire and 
Maryland have no authority to intervene into local affairs. Coe’s analysis illustrates a 
fascinating heterogeneity of state-local oversight arrangements and distinguishes two 
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pragmatic reasons for state governments to keep an eye on municipalities: 1) to make 
sure that state mandates are adequately budgeted; 2) to prevent local governments’ 
financial conditions from affecting state credit ratings. Importantly, the analysis points 
out that state oversight policy may have a strong effect on how local governments 
manage their finances. At the same time, it would be incorrect to relate the degree of state 
oversight with an improved local condition. Coe (2008) mentions that in spite of state 
controls, some local units remain in fiscal emergencies for lengthy periods.27 The 
implication of Coe’s (2008) analysis for econometric models of local sustainability is 
potential unobserved heterogeneity. One approach to controlling for it is the use of fixed 
effects. 
                                            
27 So, for example, in Ohio the average fiscal emergency for all cities in this status was 
3.7 years, with East Cleveland being an outlier - 17 years; Coalton – 13 years, 
Manchester – 8 years.  
59 
 
Chapter 4 
DATA 
Increasing public expectations of accountability and transparency as well as integration 
of local governments into capital markets through debt issuance force the governments to 
standardize and improve their financial reporting.  Joyce and Patisson (2010) envision 
that data collection and use of data-driven solutions to problems will be happening over 
the next decade and that this shift has already been initiated by the federal government. 
And yet, in spite of the available technology and associated pressures of the information 
age, local governments are far from uniformly providing researchers with financial and 
socio-economic information in a format that would lend these data for statistical analysis.  
While many local CAFRS are available on government websites, the data are not easily 
amenable to research as the information is presented in the format of PDF files, quite 
often not even searchable. As a result, documents are, perhaps, of most value to users, 
such as credit rating agencies that assess local government conditions on a case by case 
basis but not to quantitative academic analysis. The pressures of information economy 
have not affected all governments equally; yet, it is certain that sweeping changes need to 
take place before local comparative and comprehensive government research can take 
off. Specifically, local government reporting practices need to incorporate a form of 
electronic reporting that would yield reports in a spread sheet format and allow analysts 
to construct their own financial ratios based on available pieces of information.   
The dataset for this dissertation is an unbalanced panel of city records for fiscal years 
2003-2007. It includes variables from five data sources that are detailed in Table 4.  
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Table 4: Data Sources 
Variable Variable Construction Data Source 
Population 
Linear interpolation for years 
2003-2007 ** 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Decennial 
Population over 65  
Linear interpolation for years 
2003-2007 **  
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Decennial 
Occupied property  
Linear interpolation for years 
2003-2007 **  
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Decennial 
Mean income  
Linear interpolation for years 
2003-2007 ** 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Decennial 
Unemployment rate  Average for 12 months Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Employees  
Total employees excluding 
school employees/ population 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, 
Employment 
Full-time employees  
Full-time employees/Total 
employees 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, 
Employment 
Financial 
administration 
employees  
Financial administration 
employees/Total employees 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, 
Employment 
Long-term debt  Long-term debt/Population 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
Difference  
(Total revenue-total 
expenditure)/Total expenditure 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
Deficit 
If Difference <0, then 
Deficit=1; else Deficit=0 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
Severe Deficit  
If Difference <-0.1, then 
Deficit=1; else Deficit=0 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
Contracts fire, waste, 
sewerage 
Equals 1 if fire or solid waste or 
sewerage contracted out 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
Operates water 
facility 
Equals 1 if water utility revenue 
is non-zero 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
Operates transit 
company 
Equals 1 if transit company 
revenue is non-zero 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
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Operates gas 
company 
Equals 1 if gas company 
revenue is non-zero 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
Operates electric 
company 
Equals 1 if electric company 
revenue is non-zero 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances  
Total revenue  Total revenue / Population 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
Intergovernmental 
aid   
Intergovernmental aid/ Total 
revenue 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
Capital outlays  
Capital outlays/ Total 
expenditures 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
Bond fund cash 
Cash stored in bond fund/ Total 
cash securities 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
Revenue effort  
Own-source revenue/ Total 
property value 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
and GFOA 
Own revenue 
diversity  
1- (property tax revenue+sales 
tax revenue)/ 
total-own-source revenue 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
Private long-term 
debt 
Long-term debt for private 
purposes/ long-term debt 
U.S. Census Bureau, 
Annual Survey, Finances 
Number of pension 
plans 
as is GFOA 
Pension Funding 
Pension assets/Pension 
Liabilities 
GFOA 
Self-support  
Government activity fee 
revenue/ Government activity 
total expenditure 
GFOA 
Overlapping debt  Overlapping debt/ Population GFOA 
Change in net assets  
Change in net assets/Total 
expenditure 
GFOA 
Government assets  
Government activity assets/ 
Population 
GFOA 
Business-type assets  
Business-type activity assets/ 
Population 
GFOA 
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Data source details: 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly unemployment statistics for cities 
Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) Municipal Financial Indicators 
Database (2003-2007). 
**Formulas for linear interpolation: 
if var2000<var2010 then var200n=var2000 + (var2010-var2000)*n, where 
n=year; 
if var2000>var2010 then var200n=var2000 + (var2000-var2010)*n, where 
n=year. 
U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local Government Employment 
and Census of Governments (2003-2007). 
U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finances and 
Census of Governments (2003-2007). 
U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census (2000-2010). 
Depending on the model, the sample size ranges from 900 to 1100 observations. It is 
important to acknowledge that the data used in this study (and most financial research) do 
not meet strict standards of randomized experimental data. Neither do they comply with 
statistical sample design principles.28  The dataset are limited to the governments who 
applied for and received the GFOA Financial Reporting Award for years 2003-2007.  
From the perspective of financial reporting, the sample is self-selected. However, 
financial reporting excellence may or may not be related to financial performance 
excellence in any systematic way.29 The GFOA has been granting financial reporting 
awards without any regard for local financial performance. The single main goal of the 
Awards that were in place since 1946 was to standardize financial reporting. So, for 
                                            
28 Historically, the U.S. Census survey of local governments is based on a sampling 
methodology that selects survey participants based on the probability of their selection 
into the sample. Thus, the sample is self-weighted. But because the Census data were 
merged with the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the GFOA data, only the cities that had 
records for variables from al l the data sources were retained. The initial sampling design 
was, therefore, not preserved. 
29 Even if a positive correlation exists, the findings of the study show that within these 
potentially better performing governments there is significant and sufficient variation. 
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example, Flint, Michigan received the GFOA award for 10 consecutive years since its 
first fiscal emergency in 2001-2002 and even after the beginning of the second financial 
emergency in 2011.30 In spite of the above mentioned shortcomings, the data used in this 
study is a unique and probably the largest dataset of local government CAFR information 
combined with financial and employment data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Years 2003-2007 were chosen because FY 2003 was the 
first year in the database with government-wide data on net assets and FY 2007 is the last 
year of data released by the GFOA to date. 
The uniqueness of the GFOA data is not only in the fact that it reflects information from 
government wide statements but also in presenting data that are not available elsewhere. 
For example, pension liability data disaggregated by city are not easily available. Often 
researchers collect the data manually. So, for example, Rauh (2010) manually worked 
with CAFRs of 115 pension plans sponsored by states to create the dataset. Actual value 
of all property, both real and personal that is taxable by the government is also a unique 
variable. Property value is a good measure of local tax base and allows for the creation of 
measures of revenue effort. 
                                            
30 “We are pleased to report that the Government Finance Officers Association of the United 
States and Canada (GFOA) awarded a Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in Financial 
Reporting to the City of Flint for its Comprehensive Annual Financial Report for the fiscal year 
ended June 30, 2011. The City has now received this award ten years in a row. In order to be 
awarded a Certificate of Achievement, a government must publish an easily readable and 
efficiently organized Comprehensive Annual Financial Report. This report must satisfy both 
generally accepted accounting principles and applicable legal requirements.” Flint, Michigan, 
CAFR 2012. 
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Spatial Map of the Sample 
The dataset includes cities from all U.S. regions and from most U.S. states. The least 
represented region is Mid-West, which reflects two phenomena: the fact that the number 
of cities in this region is naturally smaller, and the tendency of  Mid-West cities not to 
engage with the GFOA initiatives. The total number of distinct cities included in the 
analysis is 353. All cities are repeated in the dataset at least twice across 2003-2007. The 
spatial map of the sample is presented in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Spatial Map of the Sample 
 
Deflators 
The dataset is a five-year panel that needs to be adjusted for inflation.  There are several 
different price indexes available for this purpose that were developed by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, as part of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) 
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reports. The most widely publicized are the Consumer Price Index, the GDP price 
Deflator, the Producer Price Index and a very large number of the CPI and GDP Deflator 
component indices. The choice between them usually depends on the data series that is 
being analyzed. The State and Local Purchases Deflator – a version of the GDP Price 
Deflator that is based on price changes in goods and services purchased by governments 
– is used for this analysis. This index is also applied to adjusting mean per capita income 
for inflation. The CPI might be a better option for this variable because it is based on the 
consumer basket of goods and services but it uses a different set of base years which 
would complicate the interpretation of model results.  
Table 5. State and Local Government Purchases Deflator 
Year 
State and Local Government 
Purchases Deflator31 
Implicit Price 
Deflator 
2003 90.425 94.099 
2004 94.062 96.769 
2005 100.000 100.000 
2006 105.276 103.260 
2007 111.112 106.220 
 
                                            
31
 http://www.economagic.com/em-cgi/data.exe/nipa/A301504-B829RG  - Series Title: 
State and local: Other economic affairs: Income security: Price Indexes for Government 
Consumption Expenditures and Gross Investment by Function. 
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Descriptive statistics 
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics. The mean pension funding ratio is 84 percent - the 
level exceeding the optimum level of 80-percent threshold that is largely deemed healthy 
by credit rating agencies (Brainard and Zorn, 2012). At the same time, a large standard 
deviation suggests that some governments have significantly lower funding levels than 
others. The average long-term debt per capita is 2.5 thousand dollars. This mean changes 
to 2.35 when Waco, TX – an outlier with very high levels of debt – is excluded from the 
sample. The mean difference between total revenues and expenditures is positive though 
small, suggesting that there is a large share of governments with a negative balance. As 
the next variable shows, 44 percent of the sample have a negative balance and 16 percent 
of the sample have severe deficits – a negative balance exceeding 10 percent of total 
expenditures. Population and mean incomes appear to be right-skewed due to the 
presence of New York, NY and Newport Beach, CA in the sample. These variables are 
log-transformed when they enter the econometric models. The average number of 
employees per 1000 residents is 11 but a large standard deviation suggests a significant 
variation of the size of government across cities. Thirty percent of the cities outsource 
one of the following government operations: fire, sewerage, solid waste. The mean 
proportion of financial department employees as a percent of total is 0.044 and the 
standard deviation is 0.02.  On average, cities have 83 percent of their employees 
employed full-time, with 43 percent being the minimum ratio of full-time employees and 
100 percent being the maximum. Eighty four percent of the sample run water utility 
business, thirty seven percent fund transit operations, seventeen percent run electric 
facilities and seven percent – gas companies. The mean of intergovernmental aid as a 
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share of total revenues is 17.8 percent, with some localities being fully self-sufficient and 
others, though few, highly dependent on higher intergovernmental transfers. Capital 
outlays constitute 17.6 percent of total expenditures on average. The mean revenue 
diversity – a share of own revenues from sources other than the property and sales taxes – 
is 58.9 percent. The statistics are right-skewed due to the presence of governments that 
have no sales or property tax revenues. Overlapping debt is slightly over one thousand 
dollars per capita but the standard deviation is as large as the mean, suggesting a 
considerable variation in the amount of local overlapping debt. Average government 
activity assets per capita are 2.5 thousand dollars and exceed business-type activity assets 
by one thousand dollars per capita on average. 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
Pension Funding Ratio 900 0.848 0.201 0.18 1.538 
Long-term debt (per capita)* 1100 2.535 3.600 0 68.940 
Difference (% Tot Exp) 1100 0.014 0.125 -0.578 0.826 
Deficit (binary) 1100 0.438 - 0 1 
Severe Deficit (binary) 1100 0.160 - 0 1 
Population  1100 275761 665736 65269 8214426 
Population over 65 (%) 1100 0.116 0.043 0.041 0.691 
Occupied property (%) 1100 0.926 0.037 0.721 0.980 
Mean income (per capita) 1100 25004 7427 10306 81768 
Unemployment rate  1100 5.117 1.736 1.7 14.7 
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Employees (per 1000 residents) 1100 11.348 5.765 0.502 59.336 
Full-time employees (% total) 1100 0.833 0.114 0.430 1 
Finance employees (% total) 1100 0.044 0.020 0.003 0.230 
Number of Pension Plans 924 2.113 1.058 1 7 
Contracts fire, waste, sewerage 1100 0.305 - 0 1 
Operates water facility 1100 0.841 - 0 1 
Operates transit company 1100 0.375 - 0 1 
Operates gas company 1100 0.066 - 0 1 
Operates electric company 1100 0.168 - 0 1 
Total revenue (per capita)* 1100 2.134 1.507 0.229 13.044 
Intergovernmental aid  (% total) 1100 0.178 0.118 0.000 0.747 
Capital outlays (% expenditure) 1100 0.176 0.094 0.000 0.496 
Bond fund  cash (% total cash) 1069 0.157 0.146 0.000 0.740 
Rev. Effort (Own rev/prop. value) 1100 0.029 0.037 0.000 0.065 
Own revenue diversity (index) 1100 0.587 0.164 0.147 1.000 
Fee-Support (Fees/Expend) 1100 0.170 0.105 0 1.546 
Private long-term debt (% total) 1100 0.120 0.184 0 0.976 
Overlapping debt (per capita)* 1100 1.137 1.068 0 9.055 
Change in net assets (% expend) 1100 0.156 0.188 -0.688 2.032 
Government assets (per capita)* 1100 2.550 2.351 -10.189 25.387 
Business-type assets (per capita)* 1100 1.593 1.404 -0.172 12.190 
*- measured in thousands of dollars 
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Outliers 
In 2007, the year with the largest number of observations, there are 9 cities in the dataset 
with the population over 1,000,000 people (Phoenix, Los Angeles, Sacramento, Chicago, 
New York, Philadelphia, Dallas, Houston, San Antonio); 14 cities with the population 
over 500,000 but below 1,000,000; 22 cities with the population between 300,000 and 
500,000 and the rest of the sample are cities with the population under 300,000. It is 
advantageous to work with the full sample as a larger number of observations means a 
larger number of degrees of freedom. Yet, it is important to be aware of potential 
differences between large and small cities due to size and complexity of operations that 
may mediate the relationships between variables in the model.  
New York is such an influential observation for the descriptive statistics that are not 
scaled by population, personal income or another appropriate variable that it alone 
introduces a pronounced skew into the data. However, while New York statistics inflate 
the means of many variables, they do not affect variables that are in the form of 
percentages.  New York is therefore not excluded from the sample. 
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Chapter 5 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
“Sustainability must move from being a concept 
that it debated and analyzed to one that guides 
decision making and action at all scales of 
governance and across policy sectors.”  
      Fiorino, 2010 
The analysis of data with spatially clustered repeated measurements on the same subjects 
over time presents several econometric challenges.  First, these repeated measurements 
may be non-independent. As a result, the errors in the models may be auto-correlated. In 
this case, it is important to model the covariance structure of the repeated measurements 
by indicating that one subject (city) repeats across time (years). Thus, the amount of 
information (data variability) and degrees of freedom used in calculations is reduced. For 
example, the correct modeling of covariance acknowledges that the dataset has only 110 
subjects measured over 5 years each, rather than 550 independent subjects.  To estimate 
the equations, SAS PROC MIXED is used to take into account the dependence among 
the repeated observations. The restricted maximum likelihood estimation is used to 
produce robust standard errors.32  The option Ar (1) was also used to run a first-order 
autoregressive model (one period lag) for the error structure. The models errors did not 
                                            
32 Adjusted for heteroscedasticity. 
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display error correlation properties as the estimate for the autocorrelation covariance 
parameter returned a zero. 
The second challenge is that spatially clustered subjects may have more things in 
common among each other than subjects outside of the cluster. This problem is quite 
common in survey research and often handled through methods that allow for nesting 
subjects within groups. PROC MIXED models local finances as multilevel data taking 
into account prospective differences among cities that are nested in counties and then in 
states. Cities located in geographical proximity to each other may be benchmarking their 
performance against their neighbors and, as a result, exhibit higher similarities between 
each other than between cities in other county clusters. One anecdotal example of 
comparisons to neighbors that do take place may be the fact that the city of Peoria, AZ 
posts on its official website information on debt burdens of other five large cities in the 
Maricopa county (Avondale, Chandler, Gilbert, Glendale, Scottsdale).33 Through the 
nesting of counties within states I account for error correlations at the state level.  
State fixed effects are used to partial out the effects of unobserved state level variables – 
besides time-varying state aid that is included in the models – that may affect local 
finances. Collectively, state fixed effects explain a small share of variation in all three 
dependent variables of interest. The implication of this finding is that the role of states in 
local government affairs beyond state aid disbursements is not highly pronounced on 
average.  
                                            
33 For more detailed information, please see 
http://www.peoriaaz.com/TAPE2008/indicators_debt.asp  
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Besides state fixed effects I also include time fixed effects for each of the five years. I 
acknowledge that the number of time periods is very small. The downside of such data is 
its relatively small variability. The upside of the data is that it offers more uniform 
financial data than would a panel analyzing government finances, for example, for three 
decades. The composition of financial ratios would be likely to be different across time 
due to changes in reporting standards. Besides time fixed affects that control for potential 
year specific effects, I perform a common adjustment of all variables that are expressed 
in dollars: adjustment for inflation using the State and Local Government Purchases 
Deflator (See Table 5).  A visual examination of revenue and expenditure ratios, and 
pension liability funding levels does not witness non-stationarity of the panel.  
Model for Pension Liability Funding 
The objective of the pension liability model is to identify factors that affect pension 
liability funding. The factors are grouped in three categories: variables that characterize 
the administration of government operations, variables that reflect a government’s 
financial structure and performance, and variables that measure local economic base.  
The first group of variables includes the number of employees scaled by city population, 
the number of full-time employees as a percent of total government employment, the 
number of financial management employees as a percent of total employment, the 
number of pension plans that a city participates in, an indicator variable for whether a 
government outsources either fire or solid waste or sewerage (these are most commonly 
outsourced operations), and indicator variables for whether a city runs such business-type 
activities such as water, transit, gas or electricity company.  I expect to see that the 
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number of employees per capita, the number of full-time employees per capita and the 
number of pension plans will be negatively associated with pension liability funding. The 
lower the number of beneficiaries and plans, the lower the obligations and the easier it is 
to satisfy them. The higher the number of financial administration employees as a percent 
of total city employees, the higher the level of pension liability funding. There are at least 
two mechanisms that would explain this effect. First, the amount of human resources 
available for managing finances might result in higher specialization and a better 
oversight of pension plan management. And second, financial administrators may be self-
interested in maintaining high levels of plan funding because they are future beneficiaries 
of the retirement systems. Governments outsourcing operations should have higher levels 
of pension liability funding as they do not have to be responsible for additional retirement 
benefits. Governments running utility operations may have higher levels of pension 
liability funding given the potential for using business type activity for funding pension 
plans.  
The second group of variables reflects a government’s financial structure and 
performance. I construct a measure of own revenue diversity by modifying the approach 
of Chernick et al. (2011). The authors created a revenue diversity measure as a percent of 
own-source revenues from sources other than the property tax.  I take into account that a 
vast majority of governments habitually use sales taxes as a major revenue source. 
Therefore, I create a revenue diversity measure as a percent of own-source revenues from 
sources other than the property and sales tax. Effects of revenue diversity may have either 
positive or negative association with the dependent variable. Intergovernmental aid may 
also be either positively or negatively related to pension liability funding: if aid 
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compensates for fiscal disparities then it may be negatively associated with pension 
liability funding; if state aid acts as a hard budget constraint then it is likely to exert a 
positive effect on the funding levels.  
Revenue effort, revenue per capita, a change in net assets, and cash securities measure the 
financial performance of a government. They should all be positively associated with 
pension liability funding as they provide resources for making annual required 
contributions (ARCs) in full.  Similarly to Munnell (2011) who suggests that a locality 
with fiscal  problems may meet its non-current debt obligations by cutting back on 
pension plan contributions, I expect local debt to be negatively associated with the 
dependent variable. Capital outlays are also expected to display a negative association 
with pension liability funding because these expenditure items are also likely to be 
substitutes for pension contributions for governments in the era of fiscal stress. 
The third group of variables are measures of local demography and economic conditions 
which translate into the tax base. Income per capita and the percentage of occupied 
housing units are expected to exert a positive influence on pension liability funding 
through their effects on the revenues.   
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Results 
The number of full-time employees is, as expected, negatively associated with pension 
liability funding levels: the higher the number of full-time employees the more difficult it 
is for a government to fund its retirement obligations. Since both most predictors and the 
response variable are in logarithms, most coefficients may be interpreted as elasticities. A 
one percent increase in the full-time employment is associated with a 0.18 percent 
decrease in the level of pension liability funding.  This effect becomes smaller in the 
fixed effect model and loses statistical significance. The number of financial 
administration employees, contrary to the expectations, is not a significant predictor of 
pension liability funding. The number of pension plans that a local government 
participates in has a consistently negative effect but does not reach conventional 
statistical significance levels.  
Outsourcing of government operations such as fire, sewerage, and solid waste does not 
have any direct effect on pension funding levels. Importantly, as further models will 
confirm, outsourcing is not positively associated with any of the indicators of 
sustainability examined in this work. Governments offering services in-house appear just 
as equipped to be fiscally sustainable as governments that make decisions to outsource.  
Similarly, utility company operation is not associated with better fiscal sustainability 
status. The use of business-type activity revenues to bridge budget gaps that is 
documented by Hendrick (2004) does not seem to extend beyond haphazard temporary 
actions. Systematic effects of entrepreneurship are non-existent.  
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Financial structure and performance variables – revenue diversity, revenue effort, and 
overall revenue wealth – do not reach conventional statistical significance levels in 
predicting pension liability funding. The effects of the degree of fee-funding of 
government operations are present only in the fixed effects model. 
Income per capita is negatively associated with pension liability funding levels though 
the coefficient is on the border of statistical significance. In wealthier communities, 
governments appear to be underfunding pensions more than in poorer communities.  It 
may be so because wealthier communities face higher expenditure pressures to satisfy 
expectations of the electorate or because government officials tend to avoid increasing 
already high absolute levels of taxes and which might displease the residents. It may also 
be the case that poorer communities may be more frugal and disciplined about using their 
resources and planning ahead, knowing that they do not have a rosy financial outlook for 
the future. The poverty of the tax base may make governments more conservative and 
disciplined in making financial choices. The elasticity between pension liability funding 
and the extent to which housing units are occupied in a locality is strong. A one percent 
increase in occupancy rates is associated with a 1.2 percent increase in pension liability 
funding. The effect is twice as small and non-significant in the fixed effect model but the 
direction of the effect remains the same. 
Model for Debt Burden 
Besides the three types of variables described in the pension funding model, additional 
variables of interest are included in the debt model. These variables are the overlapping 
debt of a jurisdiction and the government’s business-type activity and government 
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activity assets.  It is expected that the higher the level of the overlapping debt of a 
jurisdiction, the lower will be its own level of debt. Given that local governments report 
the levels of overlapping debt in their financial statements, the information on 
overlapping debt burden should be part of the economic environment analysis and should 
be taken into consideration by managers who make decisions about issuing debt.  
Government assets that are used as predictors in the model are pieces of information from 
local CAFRs and are calculated using the full accrual method of accounting and the 
economic resources management basis. The level of total assets of government and 
business-type activities is expected to be negatively associated with the level of debt. The 
higher the level of existing assets per capita, the lower should be the need for issuing debt 
to acquire additional assets. At the same time, a high level of a government’s assets per 
capita, which comprise not only capital plan assets but also equipment and more liquid 
assets such as cash and securities convertible into cash, may increase local government 
confidence in the ability to repay debt and contribute to the decision to issue it.  
The effects of government administration structure on debt may be either positive or 
negative. A higher number of financial administration employees may provide the 
government with additional resources for capital management and planning. A more 
efficient planning may lead to lower debt burdens. On the other hand, the number of a 
government’s employees may be associated with higher debt levels as government’s 
assets that are funded with debt are often populated by government employees. So, the 
higher the level of employment is, the higher will be the need for plant and equipment 
assets and the higher the resulting debt.  
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Utility companies of a government may be more or less demanding of capital assets and 
infrastructure. So, they may exert differential pressures on a government’s debt burden.  
Revenue effort should be positively associated with a debt burden: localities with higher 
levels of debt may need to extract higher levels of revenues from their tax base. The 
revenue effort is calculated as own source revenues divided by the actual property value 
of a jurisdiction, both real and personal.  Lastly, the importance of the tax base should 
again come through in the debt model: the higher the level of local income per capita, the 
higher the debt, the higher the population, the higher may be the pressures on government 
expenditures. 
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Results 
The number of employees per capita and the number of full-time employees are both 
significant predictors of debt levels. A one person increase in the total number of 
employees per capita is associated with a 0.015 percent increase in the level of debt. The 
percentage of full-time employees, however, has a much more pronounced effect: a one 
percentage point increase in the number of full-time employees as a share of total 
employees is associated with a 0.62 percent increase in the average level of debt. 
The operation of electric utility companies appears to exert a positive effect on local debt 
burdens. As expected, the higher the level of revenue per capita, the higher the level of 
debt per capita will be as governments need to have adequate resources to make debt 
service payments and pay out debt. What is surprising is the lack of a similar effect for 
the variable referring to revenue effort. It is measured as the amount of own-source 
revenue as a share of property value. It would be expected that governments harboring 
higher debt would exert higher revenue efforts. Neither the baseline nor the fixed effect 
models warrant such a conclusion.  
The size of business-type activity assets tends to be associated with a higher level of debt: 
cities with the richer assets tend to issue more debt. The effect is not present for 
government activity assets.  
Local economic base - income and population – is statistically significant for predicting 
debt levels. The elasticities are moderate: a one percent increase in income per capita is 
associated with a 0.37 percent increase in the debt per capita measure; a one percent 
increase in population is associated with a 0.27 percent increase in the debt level 
(according to the fixed effect model).  
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The overlapping debt does exert a negative pressure on local government own debt 
levels, however, the substantive effects of this variable are so small in both models that it 
may warrant a policy recommendation to financial managers to consider the jurisdictional 
debt more seriously. Vertical externalities, such as increased issuance costs of debt in 
heavily debt burdened areas are only one of the outcomes of a capital management 
strategy that  does not take into account the debt levels of overlapping jurisdictions. As 
the information on overlapping debt is reported in CAFRs, this information is always 
available to debt management specialists in local governments. 
Models for Budgetary Balance and Deficit 
Measures of operating position are the most widely used indicators of local governments’ 
financial position. They may be extracted from the annual operating budget, annual 
financial report, or interim financial reports. The measures abound. So, for example, 
Kleine, Kloha and Weissert (2005) analyze metrics of detecting  local fiscal distress in 15 
states and find 48 different measures of operating position (Coe, 2008). Two of the most 
commonly used variables for constructing a measure of operating position are total 
government revenues and total government expenditures. The measures of budgetary 
balance between revenues and expenditure that are used in this study come from the U.S. 
Census Bureau Annual Survey of Governments data.  
 
The difference between local revenues and expenditures may be positive (surplus) or 
negative (deficit). The U.S. Bureau of the Census, which is the source of the data for 
constructing the dependent variable, acknowledges that the data are statistical in nature 
and cannot be viewed as either surplus or deficit in accounting terms. Yet, the use of 
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negative balances as a measure of deficit is still an approximation of budgetary solvency 
and has been widely used as such by the academic community  (Hou and Smith, 2010; 
Wang et al. 2007). 
Whereas local governments that incur a deficit can cover it with resources from the 
reserves, a deficit, especially a severe one makes it more difficult for a government to 
manage another potential revenues shortfall or expenditure increase in the future.  
Local budgetary balance indicators are operationalized in three ways at detailed in Table 
3. First, I examine the total difference between revenues and expenditures. It is a 
continuous variable that can take both positive and negative values. Variables that are 
associated with an increase in this measure are viewed as the ones that contribute to 
strengthening local fiscal sustainability.   
Then, I focus on the negative balance between revenues and expenditures. I construct a 
binary variable “Deficit” equal to one if a local government has any negative balance.  
Also, I construct a binary variable “Severe Deficit”  that is equal to one if a local 
government has a negative balance that exceeds 10% of total expenditures. The choice of 
10% is guided both by theory and data. A level of 5-15% reserves as a percent of total 
expenditures is often cited in the professional literature as the optimum level of fiscal 
slack to cover prospective budget gaps (Marlowe, 2006). Even though some scholars 
dispute the utility of this 5-15% heuristics and suggest that the level of slack resources 
should be determined based on the level of fiscal risk (Hendrick, 2002, Kriz, 2003), other 
researchers defend the 5% rule citing that the probability of a local deficit beyond the 
level of 5% is quite small (Cornia and Nelson, 2003). Marlowe (2006) points out that in 
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spite of these recommendations, the mean of general fund balances of local governments 
is between 31 and 39 percent. In the data I use, the mean general fund balance is 7.5 
percent of the general fund expenditures with the standard deviation of 22 percent; the 
mean total balance is only 1.4 percent of total expenditures with the standard deviation of 
12.4 percent. The mean sinking fund balance in the data I use is 30 percent (though 11 
influential observations positively skew the mean by 8 percentage points).34 The sinking 
fund is a very broad measure of slack and it should be noted that governments maintain 
sinking funds not only to cover operating deficits but also to maintain credit ratings, have 
flexibility in budget decision making and service provision. Sinking funds are 
accumulated by governments over many years. I view a revenue and expenditure gap 
below 10% as the level of financial stress that can be comfortably accommodated by 
governments from their available slack resources. It represents roughly one standard 
deviation from the mean (|1.4%-12.4%|=11%). A level of deficit beyond this threshold is 
not only more difficult for governments to fill in for but it also may send a warning signal 
to the finance community about the scope of local financial imbalance.35  
As in the previous models, I am interested in the effects of three groups of factors on the 
total difference between revenues and expenditures and on the likelihood of a deficit and 
a severe deficit: government organization and administration, financial structure and 
performance, and local demographic and economic variables.  
                                            
34 These high sinking fund reserve holders are Olathe, KS, Rochester, MS, Waco, TX. 
Waco holds such high reserves as a strategy to maintain high credit rating (S&P:AA) on 
its very high debt of over 40 thousand dollars per capita.  
35 Ten percent may also act as a psychological threshold. 
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The number of employees per capita and the proportion of full-time employees are 
proxies for the size and organization of government. Differences between larger and 
smaller governments, governments with more traditional contracts and more 
entrepreneurial management (via part-time employment) may be informative. Financial 
administration employment is a proxy for the amount of financial human resources and 
should be negatively associated with a deficit. The direction of the effects of outsourcing 
and utility company operation is uncertain because the effects may go both ways. By 
outsourcing, a government may benefit from having fewer retirement plan beneficiaries. 
Alternatively, in-house service provision may be more economical than outsourcing.36 In 
the private arrangement of service provision, principal-agent problems may drive the 
costs up and lead governments to weaker budgetary balances. Effects of utility company 
operation may also go both ways: business-type activities typically have their fee-based 
revenues higher than expenditures so that the surpluses may be used to supplement 
government activity resources (Hendrick, 2004); or, the operation of business type 
activities may create a type of soft-budget constraint and a disincentive for local 
government management to avoid operating deficits.  
Financial structure and performance are key variables of interest in all three deficit 
equations. Specifically, the effects of own-source revenue diversity are important to 
determine. If diversification leads to lower deficits, this finding needs to guide policy 
recommendations for governments seeking to strengthen their financial position. If 
revenue diversification leads to higher deficits, then governments attempting to diversify 
                                            
36 This assumption, however, would not be supported by public choice theorists. 
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should be aware of this effects and may want to weigh the benefits of diversification 
(additional revenue) against its costs (potential deficits) more carefully. 
Like in the previous equations, intergovernmental aid may act either as a compensatory 
device for mitigating effects of relatively poorer tax bases or as a soft budget constraint 
for local budgets. In the first case, it is likely to be associated with higher deficits if the 
aid does not counteract fiscal disparities fully or, if it does counteract the disparities and 
prevents deficits - its effects may be masked with a lack of statistical significance. If the 
effect of state aid is so strong that it not only mitigates fiscal disparities and reduces 
deficits but also contributes to higher positive balances, then this variable should have a 
positive effect in the model with the total difference as the response. 
Long-term debt is expected to have a positive effect on the size of the deficit. The 
proportion of private debt as a share of total debt may also have implications for 
governments’ operating deficits. Since private purpose principal and interest payments 
are often made using specifically designated revenue sources and often by entities other 
than the governments, the effects of private purpose debt of local deficits should be 
negative: as the share of private purpose debt goes up, the likelihood of a deficit should 
go down. 
Capital outlays as a percent of total expenses and the percent of cash securities held in the 
bond fund are two other variables of interest in the group of financial performance 
variables. The effects may be negative if we proceed from the assumption that the 
wealthier the government, the higher will be its capital outlays and bond fund balances.  
Alternatively, if the effects are positive, it would mean that both bond fund securities 
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(that are often set by external authorities for local debt issuers) and capital outlays act as a 
type of pressure on governments’ budgets that conditions deficits. If that is the case, then 
a conclusion follows that local governments tend to be far from ideal capital resource 
managers.  
Change in net assets of a government as a percentage of total expenditures is expected to 
have a negative effect on the likelihood of the deficits. It acts as an important control in 
all the deficit models.   
Mean income per capita should have a negative effect on local deficits and it is also 
expected that as local unemployment increases, the governments should face higher 
expenditure pressures, lower revenues, and may have higher likelihoods of deficits as a 
result. 
The tables below present a visual summary of the variable that measures the difference 
between total revenues and expenditures as a percent of expenditures and a visual 
summary of the deficit variable that focuses on the size of the deficit. The latter set of 
plots provides also provides information on the severe deficit variable.   
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Results for Budgetary Balance 
The three most prominent variables that affect the size of the total difference are financial 
administration employment, own-source revenue diversity and capital outlays.  In the 
fixed effects models, one percentage point increase in the employment of financial staff 
as a percent of total employment is associated with a 0.44 percentage point increase in the 
budgetary balance. One percentage point increase in own-source revenue diversity is 
associated with a 0.32 percentage point increase in budgetary balance. A one percentage 
point increase in capital outlays as a percent of total expenditures is associated with a 
0.82 percentage point decrease in the level of budgetary balance.  Other variables that are 
substantively smaller but highly significant are overall government size – measured 
through the number of public officials per 1000 residents - which reduces budgetary 
balance; the operation of gas and electric facilities which also affects budgetary balance 
negatively; revenue per capita and change in net assets which increases the balance and 
the unemployment rate which, as expected, decreases the balance. Effects of some other 
variables – full time employment, long term debt per capita, proportion of private debt, 
and mean income - are not robust as they are not significant in either the baseline or the 
fixed effect model. 
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Results for Deficit 
Consistent with the previous model where government size affects budgetary balance 
negatively, an increase in government size increases the likelihood of a deficit. The effect 
persists in the severe deficit model. The effect of financial human resources increase is 
not associated with a change in the likelihood of a deficit. The implication of this finding 
and the finding in the previous model is that an increase in the proportion of financial 
administration employees does improve an already positive balance of a government but 
does not prevent it from incurring a deficit.  The variable that does have a strong effect on 
the likelihood of a deficit is local revenue diversity. The more diversified own source 
revenues are, the lower the probability of a severe deficit and any deficit. An increase in 
capital outlays as a percentage of total expenditures increases the probability of a 
government to incur a severe deficit and also any deficit. A positive change in net assets 
of a government leads to a decrease in the probability of both a severe deficit and any 
deficit.  A higher revenue effort reduces the likelihood of a severe deficit but is not 
associated with a change in the probability of any deficit.  
The unemployment rate is the only variable from the group of demographic and 
economic variables that has a robust, though not very strong effect across all the models. 
Importantly, the effect of revenue base wealth, while present in baseline models, 
disappears in the fixed effect models. Deficits and severe deficits are not the prerogative 
of communities with less fortunate revenue base.  
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has reviewed existing definitions of fiscal sustainability and relevant 
literature on adjacent concepts of fiscal health and fiscal stress to create a working 
definition of fiscal sustainability and an empirical framework for the analysis of 
sustainability at the local level.   
Theoretical definitions of fiscal sustainability at the local level are still a matter of debate.  
PriceWaterhouseCoopers describes it as the ability to manage expected financial 
requirements and financial risks and shocks over the long term without the use of 
disruptive revenue and expenditure measures (PwC, 2006).  Chapman defines it as “the 
long-run capability of a government to consistently meet its financial responsibilities.” 
(Chapman, 2008: S115)  GASB argues that fiscal sustainability is characterized through 
“a government’s ability and willingness to generate inflows of resources necessary to 
honor current service commitments and to meet financial obligations as they come due, 
without transferring financial obligations to future periods that do not result in 
commensurate benefits.” (GASB, 2011: x)  Dollery and Grant suggest that “fiscal 
sustainability could be defined to comprise the programs, expenses and other activities a 
local council must fund to meet the measurable environmental and social components of 
sustainability.” (Dollery and Grant, 2011: 44) 
As a construct for empirical research, fiscal sustainability is subject to an even larger 
controversy. The national fiscal sustainability research framework suggests that 
sustainability be examined through simulations and risk assessment models (Burnside, 
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2003; Burnhill and Kopits, 2003; Hagist and Vatter, 2009). This approach finds 
resonance with local finance scholars who study local fiscal slack (Marlowe, 2004, 2006; 
Kriz, 2003; Cornia and Nelson, 2003). Accounting-oriented researchers advocate the use 
of simple financial ratios and trend analysis (Brown, 1983; Mead 2006; Nollenberger 
2003; Kloha et al., 2005). Believers in latent factors behind fiscal behavior stand for the 
use of composite indices for fiscal sustainability, viability, and health (Hendrick, 2004; 
Joyce, 2001).  And researchers who do not put much trust in financial data conclude that 
no single ‘holy grail’ set of financial performance indicators can be constructed with any 
confidence. “The old computer adage ‘garbage in, garbage out’ perhaps best describes the 
difficulties data problems present to the calculation of satisfactory indicators of financial 
sustainability” (Dollery, Grant and Crase, 2007: 130).   
Fiscal sustainability is defined in this study as a state of government finances that allows 
a government to continuously provide services and to satisfy existing obligations without 
compromising its ability to provide services and satisfy future obligations.  Compared 
with the concept of fiscal condition, fiscal sustainability has the inter-temporal dimension 
in that it relates to the government’s ability to satisfy service requirements not only now 
but also in the future.  
This study is focused on the three key dimensions of sustainability - pension liability 
funding, debt position, and budgetary balance. It presents three types of linear regression 
methods that model the nesting of localities within counties and states and take into 
account the time-series nature of data.  Three groups of factors are hypothesized to affect 
the government’s fiscal sustainability: government organization and management, local 
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financial structure and financial performance, and local revenue base that may influence 
both revenue capacity and service needs.  
The findings suggest that an increase in the amount of full-time employees is negatively  
associated with the levels of pension liability funding. Governments with abundant 
staffing in the finance department do not appear to manage pension plan assets more 
successfully than governments with more modest staffing.  Specialization and a higher 
level of oversight over the use of resources for different programs do not increase 
efficiency. As expected, the number of pension plans in which a government participates 
and the percentage of full-time employees in total local employment exerts a negative 
pressure on the funding levels of pension plans. Surprisingly, financial structure and 
performance do not have strong effects on pension liability funding. Local economic base 
measured through the percentage of occupied housing units in a city is strongly and 
positively associated with pension liability funding, while mean personal income shows a 
negative effect. It is possible that wealthier local governments tend to have higher current 
service obligations and, as a result, tend to short-fund pensions.  
The effects of local demography and economy are prominent in the model of debt 
burden. Government asset wealth - total assets of government activities – is not 
associated with local debt levels whereas business-type activity asset wealth is, though its 
positive effects are small. The most interesting finding in the debt burden models is that a 
jurisdictions’ overlapping debt – the information on which is presented in government 
CAFRs – exerts a negative effect on local debt issuance. The effect is robust through the 
non-fixed and fixed effect models. However, the substantive effects of overlapping debt 
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are too small for it to be viewed as an important externality of debt issuance by 
overlapping jurisdictions. 
The findings in the deficit model suggest that infrastructure financing is a major culprit in 
local budgetary imbalances. Local demographic composition and revenue base do not 
appear to be significant predictors of large deficits. Local revenue diversity is identified 
as a strong predictor of deficits. The association is negative: the higher the local revenue 
diversification away from property and sales taxes is, the lower will be the probability of 
a government to incur a deficit. This effect is strong and significant across all four deficit 
models. 
The exploration of local fiscal conditions that are sustainable is still ahead for the public 
finance profession. The debate over methods and definitions just indicates that local 
fiscal reality is complex. Some researchers view existing systems of fiscal analysis as too 
difficult to comprehend. In my view, many of the approaches are not complex enough to 
reflect interrelationships among multiple factors. Simplicity should not come at the price 
of accuracy. Modern statistical methods offer a rich toolset of approaches that 
sustainability research may benefit from: structural equations, principal component 
analysis, stochastic process modeling of risks, etc. Some of these approaches would allow 
addressing the problem of endogeneity that current fiscal sustainability research does not 
seem to tackle (Burnside, 2003).   
We also need to expand the discussion of fiscal sustainability by placing it into the social 
and environmental context. And yet, we need to distinguish fiscal administration from 
overall governance of a public entity and carry out analysis aiming for parsimony that 
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translates into scientific elegance. The predicament of fiscal sustainability research – 
which may also be seen as a sign of its high relevance – is the interconnectedness of the 
fiscal policy with all the other policies of a government. Financial decisions do not exist 
in a vacuum but have a direct impact on current and future service provision. We should 
also acknowledge the tension between fiscal management and service objectives: to be 
sustainable a government might benefit from being fiscally stringent but to be a better 
service provider it might need to be more generous.  
We need to find ways to measure changes in technology and include them into the fiscal 
sustainability model. Factoring in expectations of technological advances might be risky, 
but ignoring effects of technological development on government service delivery and 
fiscal sustainability would be myopic.  
We also need to move beyond fearful scenarios of future unfunded liabilities. 
Pronouncements about grossly unfunded liabilities at any level of government do not 
always detail assumptions on which they are based: the assumption that taxing and 
spending policies will remain constant and that the probability of fulfillment of a liability 
in the future is equal to 100 percent (Davig, Leeper and Walker, 2009). These 
assumptions tend to be inaccurate, and so are the resulting pronouncements37.  Fiscal 
policies and liabilities do change, and it is an important task for policy makers to be able 
to navigate financial management and make changes in the right directions. 
We should keep in mind that fiscal sustainability analysis is not an end in itself and that it 
should not become an ivory tower. Rather, it is important because it serves a function: it 
                                            
37 For example, claims about inevitable bankruptcy of the Social Security system. 
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enables governments to provide services in a continuous manner. This capacity is 
incremental and defies a binary classification. So does fiscal sustainability. Instead, it 
may be conceptualized as a continuum, a characteristic of a government similar to the 
credit score of an individual.  The key outcome of maintaining fiscal sustainability is to 
ensure that the government has available resources to cover service needs. Just like a 
good credit score, this goal may be achieved in different ways and with various degrees 
of success.  
And finally, we might try to incorporate spatial analysis in the research on local fiscal 
sustainability more comprehensively, building on the research that has already been 
attempted by mapping fiscal health status of governments through GIS maps (Hendrick, 
2004). This research could be taken further by modeling patterns of resident responses to 
municipal fiscal stress (reviving interest to the Tieboutian arguments) and spatial 
relationships among neighboring municipalities with various degrees of fiscal 
sustainability.   
Warner (2010) predicts that to sustain economic development and high quality of life, 
local governments will need to rebuild their capacity over the next decade by rethinking 
revenue sources, renegotiating labor relations and rebuilding citizen’s view of society.  
One of Warner’s implications is that with more flexibility of labor contracts governments 
should be able to introduce more innovation and achieve a better balance between labor 
costs and service demands and implement cost savings. This study empirically confirms 
Warner’s prediction by identifying the relationship between the size of local labor force 
and pension funding levels. It also points out the positive effects of revenue 
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diversification on budgetary balance and it emphasizes the role of the demography in the 
decisions about levels of debt by local governments. 
This study has not focused on institutional arrangements that may impose a variety of 
constraints on local governments (TELS, BBRs, debt limits, home-rule status). Whereas 
these constraints matter, they do not straightjacket governments into decisions: financial 
administrators still have discretion over funds that they manage. It is through the power 
of leadership and vision that institutional constrains may be lifted. From this perspective, 
the only set of variables that are not under the control of governments are demographic 
and socio-economic characteristics of the residents who form the local revenue base. Yet, 
even here negative effects of demography and economy may be mitigated: local 
governments receive intergovernmental aid that may compensate for fiscal disparities and 
revenue challenges resulting from an impoverished revenue base. What local financial 
managers need is to know the directions of changes that would lead their jurisdictions to 
higher fiscal sustainability. These directions, such as for example, the positive impact of 
revenue diversification of fiscal health, are to be identified through quantitative data 
analysis. In addition, financial officers and other local decision makers need to be 
inspired to make changes, be courageous to make hard choices, and committed to engage 
in a meaningful dialog with the people they serve. Warner posits that “citizens need to be 
reengaged in the governance process to recognize the value of public services and to 
understand the need to balance service demands with revenue generation.” (Warner, 
2010:146)  For local governments that want to ensure fiscally sustainable futures it means 
that citizens should acknowledge that governments need to be able to raise sufficient 
revenues for accommodating increasing expenditure needs.  
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0
0
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6
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4
0
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2
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
1
-0
.2
6
0
.0
0
0
.0
8
0
.5
0
-0
.2
5
-0
.0
3
-0
.2
3
0
.1
2
-0
.0
1
0
.0
6
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
5
0
.0
8
0
.0
2
-0
.1
6
0
.1
0
0
.0
6
-0
.1
0
-0
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2
0
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8
0
.0
8
0
.3
5
0
.3
7
1
.0
0
0
.2
6
B
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in
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s 
(p
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it
a)
*
3
1
0
.0
7
0
.1
5
-0
.0
1
0
.0
1
0
.0
4
-0
.0
6
0
.1
2
-0
.1
6
0
.1
4
-0
.0
7
0
.3
0
0
.1
2
0
.0
7
0
.0
5
-0
.2
3
0
.3
1
0
.1
1
0
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7
0
.3
9
0
.2
6
-0
.2
7
0
.1
2
-0
.0
8
0
.0
8
0
.4
6
-0
.0
1
0
.0
0
0
.1
2
0
.1
2
0
.2
6
1
.0
0
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d
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e
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r
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%
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R
o
ck
 c
it
y
, 
A
rk
an
sa
s 
2
0
0
6
 
4
9
 
V
ac
av
il
le
 c
it
y
, 
C
al
if
o
rn
ia
 
2
0
0
6
 
4
1
 
B
lo
o
m
in
g
to
n
 c
it
y
, 
In
d
ia
n
a 
2
0
0
5
 
3
1
 
B
lo
o
m
in
g
to
n
 c
it
y
, 
In
d
ia
n
a 
2
0
0
6
 
3
1
 
B
lo
o
m
in
g
to
n
 c
it
y
, 
In
d
ia
n
a 
2
0
0
7
 
4
1
 
S
o
u
th
 B
en
d
 c
it
y
, 
In
d
ia
n
a 
2
0
0
3
 
1
9
 
S
o
u
th
 B
en
d
 c
it
y
, 
In
d
ia
n
a 
2
0
0
4
 
1
9
 
S
o
u
th
 B
en
d
 c
it
y
, 
In
d
ia
n
a 
2
0
0
5
 
1
6
 
S
o
u
th
 B
en
d
 c
it
y
, 
In
d
ia
n
a 
2
0
0
6
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it
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N
o
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h
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F
ay
et
te
v
il
le
 c
it
y
, 
N
o
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7
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4
 
D
u
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 C
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3
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1
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it
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N
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 C
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2
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0
4
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0
 
D
u
rh
am
 c
it
y
, 
N
o
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h
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0
5
 
2
6
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it
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N
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1
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it
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N
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3
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8
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it
y
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h
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4
 
2
7
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ro
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it
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N
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h
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5
 
2
4
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ro
 c
it
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N
o
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2
0
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6
 
2
9
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it
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1
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2
1
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o
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n
a 
2
0
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6
 
2
3
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m
in
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 c
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y
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o
rt
h
 C
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o
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n
a 
2
0
0
7
 
2
5
 
R
al
ei
g
h
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it
y
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N
o
rt
h
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o
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3
 
2
6
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h
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, 
N
o
rt
h
 C
ar
o
li
n
a 
2
0
0
4
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5
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1
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h
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it
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7
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9
 
P
o
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d
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it
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n
 
2
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3
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0
 
P
o
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d
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it
y
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2
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4
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1
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 c
it
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5
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2
 
P
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 c
it
y
, 
O
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n
 
2
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6
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0
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it
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, 
P
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n
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2
0
0
3
 
4
1
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 c
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6
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4
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 c
it
y
, 
P
en
n
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2
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7
 
4
2
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 c
it
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R
h
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 c
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 c
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